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Global Governance of Antitrust and the Need for a BRICS Joint Research 
Platform in Competition Law and Policy 
 
Ioannis Lianos 
 
ABSTRACT 
In May 2016 the BRICS competition authorities signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU), which puts in place an Institutional Partnership between BRICS 
jurisdictions in the area of competition law through a general framework for multilateral 
cooperation. The paper takes stock of these recent developments and suggests the 
establishment of a BRICS Joint Research Platform which, in addition to its task to 
improve the quality of decision-making within BRICS’ competition authorities, will also 
serve as an alternative forum in the constitution of a global deliberative space in the 
area of competition law.  
The paper offers a critical analysis of the call for policy convergence in 
competition law, which merely emanates from the global business community and 
enables established competition law regimes, such as that of the US and Europe, to 
influence the convergence point and more generally to take ownership of the process 
of global convergence of competition law.  
The paper criticizes this state of affairs for not taking into account the different 
patterns of diffusion of competition law and consequently the variety of competition 
law systems emerging out of the original US antitrust law model and its EU competition 
law “spin-off”. In particular, it castigates the lack of participation in this global 
deliberative space of emergent and developing economies and the inability of various 
affected interests, beyond global businesses and, to a limited extent, consumers, to 
be considered. The study takes a broader perspective and puts forward a 
“participation-centred” approach that would seek to avoid both majority and minority 
biases, the ultimate objective being not policy convergence as such, but increasing 
levels of total trust between competition authorities and between competition 
authorities and their stakeholders. The BRICS Joint Research Platform may play an 
important role in contributing to the establishment of this new architecture of global 
governance of competition law. 
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Global Governance of Antitrust and the need for a BRICS Joint Research 
Platform in Competition Law and Policy 
 
Ioannis Lianos1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
While at the end of the 1970s only nine jurisdictions had a competition law, and 
only six of them had a competition authority in place, in 2016 more than 120 
jurisdictions around the world have adopted and effectively implemented competition 
law2. During the same time we witnessed an increase in the activity of new competition 
authorities, in the area of merger control but also beyond3. The more authorities are 
involved in reviewing global merger transactions or are investigating global cartels, the 
more the complexity of bilateral co-operation increases. It is frequent that the same 
transaction will be reviewed by more than a dozen competition authorities around the 
world. As a recent OECD report indicates: 
“(t)he Co-operation Complexity Index for merger deals has increased by about 
23 times from 1995 to 2011 […] The index can also be calculated for cartel 
enforcement, as a function of the number of authorities involved and the 
number of investigations with an international element. For international cartel 
investigations, the Co-operation Complexity Index has increased by about 53 
times between 1990-1994 and 2007-2011”4.  
This proliferation of national competition laws sets important challenges for the global 
governance of antitrust, by which concept I refer to the management of the risks 
generated by the increased interconnectedness of cross-border enforcement of 
competition law. An important risk involves the costs of “cross-jurisdictional 
disagreement,” which, it is alleged, may create particularly complex situations for 
international businesses5. These disagreements may also affect the effectiveness of 
competition law enforcement, as it is increasingly more difficult for competition law 
regimes to impose remedies that take into account the negative externalities imposed 
by the specific anticompetitive conduct, not only to their own consumers, but also to 
the consumers of other jurisdictions. For instance, a global merger may affect the 
market of a handful of jurisdictions, each having the possibility to block it, in case of 
course it has a sufficient size to affect the incentives of the merging firms. As no 
                                                          
1 Professor of Global Competition Law and Policy, Director, Centre for Law, Economics and Society, 
UCL Faculty of Laws; Leading Researcher, Skolkovo-HSE Institute for Law and Development 
(Moscow). The author would like to thank Frederic Jenny and Alexey Ivanov for helpful comments and 
Matt Strader for efficient research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2 OECD, Challenges of International Co-operation in Competition Law Enforcement (2014), available 
at https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Challenges-Competition-Internat-Coop-2014.pdf . 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., p. 28.  
5 Ibid., p. 39. 
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jurisdiction controls more than 20% of the global GDP, it looks likely that if one 
jurisdiction takes a decision on the basis of its domestic concerns, this may potentially 
produce important externalities to the consumers of the other jurisdictions. It is also 
clear that decisions to block or clear a merger are not “symmetrical”: for a global 
merger to go through it needs the agreement of more than 4 or 5 jurisdictions, while 
for a global merger to be blocked, the opposition of a significant jurisdiction in terms 
of global GDP may be sufficient, the stricter substantive standard usually prevailing6. 
A recent OECD report explains that while “(f)rom 1990 to 2011, […] the 
complexity of co-operation has increased 20 times or more, the legal mechanisms for 
co-operation have hardly evolved”7. This gap in the global governance of competition 
law has led many to argue for a strategy of incremental policy convergence, 
augmented by the elaboration of a number of global institutional mechanisms to 
enhance cooperation among various jurisdictions in the area of competition law8. It is 
clear that further international cooperation should be promoted, but one needs to 
understand the practical limits of cooperation in the context of an increasingly more 
complex institutional environment and conflicting approaches in matters of economic 
policy, including competition law. It is also important to assess more critically the 
“policy convergence” claim, as it might not be practically achievable and theoretically 
appealing to strive for greater policy convergence in the area of competition law. A 
critical analysis of the factors pushing for a greater diversification of competition law 
regimes is therefore needed, before exploring the possibilities for global governance 
of antitrust to tame the negative effects of such diversification and complexity.  
The first part of the paper critically explores the claim for “policy convergence” 
in this area and concludes that this is practically unachievable and normatively 
contestable. The paper argues that the concept and mechanisms of “policy 
convergence” should be replaced by a different conceptual framework for the global 
governance of competition law that emphasises the establishment of higher levels of 
trust between the different competition authorities, but also between the authorities 
and the people (or stakeholders).  
The second part of the paper explores the role of BRICS in the establishment 
of an architecture of global governance in this area so that it corresponds better to the 
dynamics of systemic transformation of the competition law enterprise and the 
challenges posed by expanding global interdependence in this area. I argue for a more 
intensive cooperation between BRICS jurisdictions in the area of competition law and 
policy, the first step of that process being the recent establishment of a BRICS Joint 
                                                          
6 Ibid., p. 43. 
7 Ibid., p. 53. 
8 See, for instance, PEREZ MOTTA, Eduardo (2016), Competition Policy and Trade in the Global 
Economy: Towards an Integrated Approach, The E15 Initiative, World Economic Forum, available at 
http://e15initiative.org/publications/competition-policy-trade-global-economy-towards-integrated-
approach/ ; OECD, Challenges of International Co-operation in Competition Law Enforcement (2014), 
available at https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Challenges-Competition-Internat-Coop-2014.pdf . 
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Research Platform. I consider that such cooperation may not only serve the interests 
of the BRICS jurisdictions by enhancing the quality of their competition law 
enforcement, but that it will also constitute a significant contribution to a more inclusive 
and participation-centered model for the global governance of competition law and 
policy. 
 
II. Global Governance of Competition Law does not mean Global 
Policy Convergence of Competition Law 
 
Recent discussions over the need for an architecture of global governance in 
competition law and policy have turned around the need to achieve policy 
convergence and the various mechanisms that may be put in place so as to promote 
international cooperation between competition authorities with the aim to reduce the 
occurrence of conflicting outcomes when more than one competition law authority are 
investigating the same competition law case. The “heterogeneity” of competition laws 
is seen as a source of large costs for companies active in multiple foreign markets as 
well as for the competition law authorities which are obliged to run multiple parallel 
investigations. Although the narrative of policy convergence has been a factor driving 
international cooperation in the area of competition law, the assumptions on which it 
relies upon and its normative implications have not been examined in depth. It is 
usually assumed that globalization of economic activity provides the legal irritant for 
the development of competition law regimes worldwide with the aim to regulate the 
negative externalities of global capitalism, in particular the exercise of market power 
in transnational markets. From this perspective, the adoption of competition laws in 
various jurisdictions is subject to similar principles of development, thus implying that 
once the various competition law regimes reach a similar level of maturity they will 
tend to converge as they will have to respond to a similar set of external stimuli (the 
so called “absolutist view”)9.  
I consider that such proposition is neither descriptively accurate nor normatively 
appealing. First, although the various competition law regimes around the world 
emanate from similar sources and represent to a certain extent a modified version of 
the original model developed in the United States (US) during the late 19th century and 
early 20th century, a closer look to the global diffusion of competition law in particular 
the last three decades indicates that the different trajectories pursued by each 
competition law regime establish complex relations of path dependence that cannot 
be accounted for by the “absolutist view”. I explore an alternative theoretical 
                                                          
9 For such claim see, PRIEST, George, Competition Law in Developing Nations: The Absolutist View, 
in (D. Sokol, T. Cheng & I. Lianos eds.) COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT  (Stanford 
University press, 2013), p. 79 (advancing the view that there is an optimal competition law based on a 
set of competition law principles for which there is widespread agreement and that despite the different 
economic and cultural settings, the competition laws of all nations should in principle be identical. Any 
deviation from this optimal competition law model should be adequately explained and accounted for). 
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framework, policy diffusion, which challenges the simple assumptions of the “policy 
convergence” model and enables us to set the conceptual foundations of the global 
governance of competition law on firmer theoretical and empirical ground. Second, I 
explore the conceptual fuzziness of “policy convergence” and the implicit normative 
assumptions made as to the desirable “convergence point”. This leads me to 
underscore the profound incompatibility between the claims for “policy convergence” 
and the multi-polar foundations of the global economy, as well as the legal pluralism 
of the international legal order. I conclude this part by arguing for a different conception 
of global governance in this area, which would aim to enhance trust between 
competition authorities, but also between competition authorities and the people (their 
stakeholders) at a transnational level. 
 
A. The global diffusion of competition law  
 
Policy diffusion has been defined as “the process whereby policy choices in 
one unit are influenced by policy choices in other units”10. Policy transfer consists in a 
form of policy diffusion and sometimes it is considered as a related concept 11 . 
“Diffusion” has been described as “any process where prior adoption of a trait or 
practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining non-
adopters”12. By emphasizing the interdependence of the policy choices effectuated by 
States, diffusion theory assumes that the outcome for each actor (here a State) 
depends on the choices of all other actors with which they share some form of 
interdependence (e.g. trade related, spatial interdependence, cultural, 
communicational). Although a product of interdependence, diffusion does not lead to 
similar outcomes across jurisdictions. The diffusion of competition law in different 
political settings and legal traditions illustrates its great malleability and the operation 
of various background factors.  
One should therefore distinguish diffusion from convergence, as the former 
concept pre-supposes the existence of interdependence, while convergence may be 
caused by interdependence but also by different common factors, such as the fact that 
the specific units may react to similar, independent pressures (e.g. globalization)13.  
                                                          
10 GRAHAM, Erin, SHIPAN, Charles R., VOLDEN, Craig, (2013) The Diffusion of Policy Diffusion 
Research, British Journal of Political Science, 43(3), pp. 673-701. 
11 MAGGETTI, Martino & GILARDI, Fabrizio, (2016) Problems (and solutions) in the measurement of 
policy diffusion mechanisms, Journal of Public Policy, 36(1), pp. 87-107, 90 (noting that there is 
“significant overlap” between policy transfer and policy diffusion). 
12 STRANG, David (1991), Adding Social Structure to Diffusion Models – An Event History Framework, 
Sociological Methods and Research, 19(3), pp. 324-353; HEINZ, Torben (2011), Mechanism-Based 
Thinking on Policy Diffusion, No. 34 KFG Working Paper, Freie Universität Berlin; DOBBIN, Frank, 
SIMMONS, Beth, GARRETT, Geoffrey (2007), The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social 
Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?, Annual Review of Sociology, 33, pp. 449-472. 
13 MAGGETTI, Martino & GILARDI, Fabrizio, (2016) Problems (and solutions) in the measurement of 
policy diffusion mechanisms, Journal of Public Policy, 36(1), pp. 87-107. 
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The diffusion of competition law, from the United States, where it was first 
framed as a distinct legal field at the end of the 19th century, in different political 
settings and legal traditions illustrates its great normative appeal and its conceptual 
flexibility, as pretty much the same conceptual framework has been used in the various 
jurisdictions adopting competition law. Despite this common core, the adoption and 
effective implementation of competition law has been nevertheless characterized by a 
great degree of variability among jurisdictions, notwithstanding the considerable role 
played by international actors aiming to generate different mechanisms of policy 
convergence (substantive and/or procedural): the ICN, UNCTAD, OECD, the EU and 
other regional integration models and, the influence of common background factors, 
such as the globalization of markets, the professionalization of economic advice, the 
development of technocratic competition law enforcement.  
This diversity is not only reflected in the adoption of different models of 
competition law across various jurisdictions, but also in the way this area of law has 
been effectively implemented. The implementation of competition law varies of course 
within each jurisdiction through time and often depends on the specific institutions in 
place, their capabilities, but also the policy area in which it is intervening (e.g. energy, 
telecommunications, healthcare services, etc.). There might also be some dissonance 
between the intended enforcement of competition law, as this is proclaimed in the 
foundational texts, guidelines, legislation, constitutional (or other) provisions that have 
been put it in place in each jurisdiction, and its day-to-day operation in the specific 
jurisdiction. 
Among the factors explaining the diversity of competition law systems in various 
jurisdictions, the most important ones consist in the patterns of diffusion (that is, the 
mechanisms of interdependence that lead to the adoption and implementation of a 
specific policy by another State), and in more general background factors affecting the 
interdependence among jurisdictions, such as the interaction of politics with 
transnational expert communities, the relations between government and global or 
transnational business, the important role of state capitalism and State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) in global trade, the role of other societal groups (e.g. consumers, 
labor unions) that are trans-nationally organized, and the role of domestic struggles of 
power and influence when these reproduce relatively common (from a cultural 
perspective) political/ideological or expertise-related struggles (“the 
internationalization of palace wars”14). 
Policy diffusion should be understood broadly as consisting of: (1) adoption, 
and (2) implementation. Adoption refers to the formal introduction of the competition 
law regime into the legal system. Implementation may be conceptualized as referring 
to the stages after the decisional point of adoption and must be understood as referring 
                                                          
14 DEZALAY, Yves & GARTH, Brian (2002), The Internationalization of Palace Wars (The University of 
Chicago Press, 2002). 
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to the “depth of adoption”. This includes the direct practical experience with 
competition law indicated, among others, by the frequency of its use, its scope, the 
quality of competition assessment, its role in the specific polity, its institutionalization 
and permanence within a specific organizational structure, enduring through elections 
and changes in government. The process of implementation of the competition law 
regime into a specific organizational and institutional context is prolonged and has 
several phases. It should not be excluded that the transplantation of competition law 
in political and legal systems that do not present functional equivalents to the system 
where the transplant originated may produce completely different outcomes, leading 
to situations of diffusion without convergence. 
Diffusion may be vertical, horizontal, or both. Vertical diffusion operates through 
higher levels of governance, for example through the influence of international 
organizations or the federal level, when exploring intra-state processes of diffusion. 
The most important of the former are international organizations (OECD, UNCTAD, 
EU), international networks (ICN), or regional economic integration organizations (e.g. 
EU). Horizontal diffusion involves interconnectedness of governments when elites 
communicate and interact, exchanging ideas, solutions, and experiences.  
Focusing on diffusion as a product of interdependence, rather than on the 
process of policy convergence as such, enables us to explore the reasons competition 
law has been diffused across many jurisdictions and assess the influence of the 
process of diffusion to its substantive and procedural framework, in comparison to the 
original model of the Sherman Act and US antitrust law in general. One should 
understand that there are different patterns of diffusion, indicating the existence of 
various trajectories of this original “model” and the operation of various forms of 
interdependence between the various units of analysis (in our case competition law 
systems). 
Diffusion literature has put forward the following typology of mechanisms 
(patterns) of diffusion15: 
 learning resulting from internal (e.g. the characteristics of public administration, 
legal and constitutional frameworks, administrative culture) or external (e.g. 
transnational institutional linkages, government decisional interdependence, 
epistemic communities) sources;  
 externalities, providing incentives altering the cost-benefit ratios of domestic 
actors, such as competition among governments for resources (leading them 
to adopt and implement similar “successful” policy innovations)16; coercion 
                                                          
15 HEINZ, Torben (2011), Mechanism-Based Thinking on Policy Diffusion, No. 34 KFG Working Paper, 
Freie Universität Berlin. DE FRANCESCO, Fabrizio (2013), Transnational Policy Innovation: The OECD 
and the Diffusion of Regulatory Impact Analysis, Colchester: ECPR Press; DOBBIN, Frank, SIMMONS, 
Beth, GARRETT, Geoffrey (2007), The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, 
Coercion, Competition, or Learning?, Annual Review of Sociology, 33, pp. 449-472. 
16 MAGGETTI, Martino & GILARDI, Fabrizio, (2016) Problems (and solutions) in the measurement of 
policy diffusion mechanisms, Journal of Public Policy, 36(1), pp. 87-107, 90 (noting that “success can 
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(when the diffusion of the specific policy innovation results from the use of 
material or economic power, including asymmetric bargaining imposing 
conditionality for these reforms, or binding legal norms adopted by 
supranational institutions), and contractualization (when diffusion results from 
some form of symmetric bargaining between states, or “soft” international 
organization influence); 
 socialisation among networks of experts and/or administrative elites that 
develop shared understandings and beliefs due to their continuous interaction;  
 emulation indicating the “desire (or need) of domestic actors to conform to 
internationally widespread norms” in order to “increase the legitimacy of policy 
choices”17; 
Some recent studies have focused on the micro-foundations of trans-border policy 
diffusion, advancing the importance of the electorate in pushing for the adoption of 
“successful” policy innovations developed elsewhere (the voter information model or 
the democratic foundations of diffusion)18. These various patterns of diffusion alter the 
incentives of domestic actors and may lead to different policy outcomes, even if the 
“original” policy design diffused is the same. Various diffusion mechanisms may work 
in parallel and lead to a complex trajectory, eventually establishing path-dependences 
that affect the evolution of the policy transferred in the specific jurisdiction. The role of 
domestic actors and their participation in the emergence of competition law norms and 
the diffusion, more generally, of competition law should not be ignored. 
Focusing on diffusion, rather than on the existence, or not, of convergence, 
presents several advantages. First, it avoids the conceptual narrowness of 
convergence, which views the specific policy, in this case competition law, from the 
perspective of the actors affected, focusing on the outcomes of the policy process, 
and largely ignoring the policy process itself. Diffusion theory enables the researcher 
to move beyond the analysis of the outcomes of the policy process. It provides 
important clues as to why policies spread in some jurisdictions, and not in others, and 
as to the extent to which the pattern of diffusion may impact on the content of the 
policies diffused. Second, diffusion may be “operationalized” with the help of indicators 
linked to specific patterns of diffusion, thus offering to the researcher the opportunity 
to measure policy diffusion. Finally, it highlights the various forms of interdependence 
                                                          
be related to (a) the goals that the policy is designed to achieve, (b) the challenges of its implementation 
and/or (c) its political support”. 
17 HEINZ, Torben (2011), Mechanism-Based Thinking on Policy Diffusion, No. 34 KFG Working Paper, 
Freie Universität Berlin. To the difference of learning, which is related to the “objective consequences” 
of a policy, emulation puts emphasis on the “symbolic and socially constructed characteristics of 
policies”, regardless of whether or not the policies “work” in the specific jurisdiction. In other words, the 
material consequences of adopting and implementing a specific policy “carry less weight than the 
pressure to conform to a norm within a given peer group”: MAGGETTI, Martino & GILARDI, Fabrizio, 
(2016) Problems (and solutions) in the measurement of policy diffusion mechanisms, Journal of Public 
Policy, 36(1), pp. 87-107, 91. 
18 LINOS, Katerina (2013), The Democratic Foundations of Policy Diffusion (Oxford Univ. Press, 2013). 
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linking the various policy actors, rather than insisting on their common or divergent 
reaction to common factors affecting them. This narrows down the scope of analysis 
to an element that is intrinsically linked to the governance of the interactions between 
actors, rather than the more esoteric study of the way these different actors experience 
the impact of the common background factors affecting them. It also explains why 
expecting policy convergence once the various competition law regimes have attained 
a level of maturity may be profoundly misguided. 
 
B. The futile call for global policy convergence 
 
Although “policy convergence” is the talk of the day among antitrust enforcers 
at a global level, the concept is still in search of a definition. David Gerber explains 
that “(t)he term convergence necessarily refers to a process of movement towards a 
center”, the so called “convergence point”19. The discussion over competition law 
convergence at a global scale seems to indicate the process by which the 
characteristics of individual competition law systems increasingly resemble some set 
of “characteristics” representing the convergence point or “model”. For Gerber, this 
convergence point in global antitrust is currently the “economics-based model” of 
competition law, as this has developed in the US. This model relying on the proposition 
that “economics should be the basis for competition law norms”20. I would even further 
claim that this model should not be characterised as “economics-based”, but as 
“Neoclassical Price Theory economics based” or “NPT-based” model, as the economic 
knowledge inspiring this model emanates from the Neoclassical Price Theory 
approach and ignores to a great extent other intellectual traditions in economics. 
The choice of the specific “convergence point”, an idealized, and for that reason 
largely partial, view of the US model, may be explained by historical reasons, as US 
antitrust law grandfathered competition law statutes in other nations, by economic 
ones, in view of the importance of the US in the global economy, as well as by politico-
ideological ones as the current version of neo-liberalism characterizing the design and 
structures of the global economy has been very much a product of the US hegemony 
in the world. The idea that the US system is more “advanced” and “sophisticated” than 
that of other nations, relies on various distinguishing elements of the US model: the 
significant experience collected through a more than a century old, mostly private, 
competition law enforcement; the presence in the US of a significant community of 
competition law scholars, economists and lawyers, which is highly influential at a 
global scale, partly because of the greater internationalisation of higher education in 
the US, the prevalence of US-based law firms in global antitrust enforcement, the 
                                                          
19 GERBER, David J. (2016), Global competition law convergence: Potential roles for economics, in 
Theodore Eisenberg and Giovanni B. Ramello (eds.), Comparative Law and Economics, pp. 206-235, 
207-209.. 
20 Ibid., 213. 
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important role of global economic consultancies, most of which are based or constitute 
spin-offs of US-based firms; the presence in the US of multinational enterprises that 
frame their contractual or other arrangements and business practices so as to comply 
to US antitrust standards and which are less keen in accepting additional compliance 
costs resulting from other competition law regimes.  
During the last two decades EU competition law has also gained considerable 
influence in framing the global competition law “model”, or “convergence point”. 
Because of the administrative nature of EU competition law enforcement, which has 
influenced the way most nations have organized their competition law enforcement 
systems, legal culture (as civil law systems are prevalent) but also more generally in 
view of their enforcement capabilities (as their court system remains relatively under-
developed in areas of economic regulation), most countries seem to follow with some 
degree of differentiation the institutional design of the EU model. EU law doctrines 
have also exercised a considerable influence in framing the substantive law standards 
in various areas, as EU competition law has itself entered into a process of 
“modernization” according to the precepts of the US inspired “NPT-based model”, 
generating a considerable number of normative texts and guidelines, inspired by the 
most recent economic analysis and setting clear principles for competition law 
enforcement in various areas. These have proven a considerable source of inspiration 
for many competition law authorities around the world. Although they manifestly are 
products “made in the EU”, their intellectual underpinnings originate for the most part 
in the other side of the Atlantic and emanate from the US model of neoliberalism, and 
not that developed in Freiburg by the so called ordo-liberal version of neo-liberalism. 
This becomes clear if one looks to the areas of EU law that are usually put forward as 
exportable products. These do not usually include areas of EU law where the ordo-
liberal model has exercised some influence and which seem less compatible with the 
“NPT-based model” of competition law serving as the point of convergence. 
As its name indicates, the “NPT-based model” of competition law largely relies 
on economic concepts, methods and overall narratives. Perceived as forming a 
“naturalist order”, pre-existing any intervention by the State21, global markets are 
supposed to be free and stay so, state intervention being limited only in the confined, 
by neoclassical price theory, situations of market failure 22 . In these cases, the 
                                                          
21 See, however, HARCOURT, Bernard, The Illusion of Free Markets – Punishment and the need of 
Natural Order (Harvard University press, 2012) criticizing “the ‘illusion’ of ‘free markets’ perceived as a 
natural order that pre-exists regulation”. 
22 A market failure is a general term describing situations in which market outcomes are not Pareto 
efficient. Pareto efficiency, also referred to as allocative efficiency, occurs when resources are so 
allocated that it is not possible to make anyone better off without making someone else worse off, or 
stated otherwise, where (scarce) resources are used to produce the mix of good and services which is 
most valued by society. This is a very abstract concept, which is grounded on the theoretical construct 
of general equilibrium, which looks at the economy in its entirety, that is, where all markets are 
considered together. In practice, though, the case against monopoly (as the archetypal example of 
market failure due to market power) is based on partial equilibrium analysis, which looks at only one 
market at a time, characterised by its demand and supply curves. To focus on a single market rests on 
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“technology” of economic efficiency analysis, developed by economists, will provide 
the necessary direction and, if performed well, will produce similar results to those 
expected by free markets 23 . These two principles, free markets and economic 
efficiency, are interchangeable, the core of economic theory being based on the idea 
that free markets are efficient24. To the extent that competition law adheres to the goal 
of economic efficiency, its intervention will be considered adequate when artificial 
barriers, either public or private, impede free markets to produce their full potential. 
Cartels constitute the quintessential example of a private barrier to the free operation 
of a market, a free market being considered as one in which each economic operator 
determines independently his conduct. State restrictions may also restrict efficiency, 
in particular if they originate from rent-seeking and regulatory capture.  
The call for “policy convergence” in competition law may thus be understood as 
seeking to develop competition law regimes that promote free markets and economic 
efficiency, while at the same time striving to develop a (global) regime that reduces 
regulatory barriers emanating from regulatory divergence. Regulatory divergence has 
implications for businesses interested in foreign markets expansion. It may create 
obstacles to international trade due to cultural differences (e.g. prior beliefs over the 
costs of type I or type II errors, market-based and individualist values as opposed to 
more collective values), but also because of different regulatory methods, procedures 
and traditions. Hence the claim for policy convergence in this context may be 
considered as a functional equivalent to greater economic integration, whose aim is 
also to erode barriers to trade with the removal of regulatory impediments and the 
convergence towards unified or, at least, compatible regulatory standards.  
This is of course a desirable objective from the point of view of the economic 
actors subject to regulation, as the cost of complying with one (similar) set of legal 
norms is evidently lower than that of having to comply with different (or stricter) legal 
norms. Removing regulatory differences and converging to a “NPT-based model” of 
competition law may promote the process of “international economic integration”25, an 
                                                          
the assumption that the levels of income and the prices of both substitute and complement products 
are fixed (ceteris paribus). 
23  Indeed, according to the neoliberal view of the State, markets constitute a site of “veridiction-
falsification” for governmental practice, based on the assumption that “[…] inasmuch as prices are 
determined in accordance with the natural mechanisms of the market they constitute a standard of truth 
which enables us to discern which governmental practices are correct and which are erroneous”: 
FOUCAULT, Michel, The Birth of Biopolitics – Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, (Picador, 
reprint ed. 2010), 32. State intervention should therefore be evaluated from the viewpoint of market 
principles. 
24 Economics relies on free markets, real or fictitious, in order to develop evaluation criteria: see the 
seminal works of COURNOT, Augustin, Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des 
richesses (1838) translated in English as A. Cournot, Researches on the Mathematical Principles of the 
Theory of Wealth (1897, Macmilland & Co.) & MARSHALL, Alfred, Principles of Economics (8th ed., 
1890, Macmillan & Co.). 
25 On the emergence of the theory of international economic integration see, MACHLUP, Fritz, A History 
of Thought on Economic Integration, (Macmillan Press, 1977), noting that economists in the inter-war 
era employed the negative noun of “disintegration” of the world economy, probably as a consequence 
of the national protectionist legislation (including national cartels) that followed the economic crisis of 
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ideal to which the concept of “policy convergence” alludes to. “Policy convergence” 
aims to reproduce the results of “economic integration”, regulatory sameness or 
similarity with the consequent limitation of barriers to trade, without however imitating 
the institutional mechanisms of “economic integration”, which are thought of as being 
relatively heavy, in the sense that they require some intense transnational institution-
building (e.g. putting in place institutions ensuring negative integration and/or positive 
integration), and politically risky, as these institutions may escape the authority of the 
sovereign State. 
One may understand this strategy as a follow up of functionalist theories, which 
were the first to break away “from the traditional link between authority and a definite 
territory by ascribing authority to activities based in areas of agreement”26. States 
exercise several functions (activities), some of which require action at the international 
level. This transfer initiates the process of integration, which is driven by the 
continuous pursuit of these functions, in the context of an international institution (or 
informal network) created to that effect. According to functionalism, “(e)very function 
is left to generate others gradually; in every case the appropriate authority is left to 
grow and develop out of actual performance”27. The functionalist approach and the 
concept of integration are profoundly interlinked: without the functionalist emphasis on 
the existence of separate functions, where authority can be transferred, there can be 
no integration, in the sense political scientists give to this term.  
Neo-functionalism’s starting point is social differentiation: society is carved in 
various specialized and autonomous sectors, operating independently but gradually in 
more intensive cooperation with each other, as a consequence of the spill-over effect. 
Technocratic economic issues are perceived separately from contentious political or 
social ones. At the same time, they are profoundly interlinked within the same 
continuum. According to Haas, the initiator of the theory, “the supranational style 
stresses the indirect penetration of the political by way of economic[s] because the 
‘purely’ economic decisions always acquire political significance in the minds of the 
participants” 28 . At the same time, “the measure of political success inherent in 
economic integration lies in the demands, expectations and loyalties of the political 
actors affected by the process, which do not logically and necessarily follow from 
statistical indices of economic success”29. It is clear in neo-functionalist theory that a 
                                                          
1929. The positive noun of “integration” was first employed after the Second World War in order to 
provide a conceptual vehicle for the efforts of “integration of the Western European economy”, the 
substance of which “would be the formation of a single large market within which quantitative restrictions 
on the movements of goods, monetary barriers to the flow of payments and, eventually, all tariffs are 
permanently swept away”: Ibid., p. 11, referring to Paul Hoffmann’s official pronouncement to the 
Council of the Organisation of European Economic Co-operation on October 31, 1949 
26 MATTLI, Walter, The Logic Of Regional Integration – Europe and Beyond (Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), p. 21. 
27 MITRANY, David, A Working Peace System (Quadrangle Books: Chicago, 1966). 
28 HAAS, Ernst B., Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe, in in. Joseph S. Nye, ed., International 
Regionalism: A Reader (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), 149-166, p. 152. 
29 HAAS, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe (Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 13. 
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“purely” economic scheme “does not by itself answer the basic political question 
whether the unified economy meets with the satisfaction of people active within it”30. 
The political and the economic dimension of integration are profoundly interlinked. 
However, the social actors influencing the decision-making at these supranational 
settings may be different than those participating in domestic political processes. The 
main actors in the process of integration are experts operating independently from 
their national political constituents although they are at the same time checked by 
“equally prescient national actors”31. Their aim is to promote, first, sectoral economic 
integration and, following “spill-over”, other forms of integration. The process of 
decision-making is incremental32.  
The concept of integration relies on “authority-legitimacy transfer or sharing” in 
different areas33. As “institutionalization” constitute(s) an indicator for authority and 
legitimacy34, the formation of common institutions reveals that a higher degree of 
integration has been achieved. Building global institutions, such as a global 
competition authority, may however be an impossible task, although one may expect 
that a higher intensity of business transactions producing multi-jurisdictional effects 
could over time make this option a more realistic possibility.  
In contrast, “policy convergence” does not require any “authority-legitimacy 
transfer or sharing”, but simply relies on the independent and voluntary decision of a 
number of States to converge towards the same regulatory model/convergence 
point35 . This is usually managed by members of national bureaucracies working 
together in the context of formal and informal “government networks”36. Although the 
process is different, the sought effect is the same as that sought by “integration”, which 
                                                          
30 Ibid., p. 284. 
31 HAAS, Ernst B., The Study of Regional Integration – Reflections on the joy and Anguish of 
Pretheorizing, International Organization, 24(4) (1970), 607-646, p. 627. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., p. 633. 
34 Ibid. 
35 GERBER, David J., Global competition law convergence: Potential roles for economics, in Theodore 
Eisenberg and Giovanni B. Ramello (eds.), Comparative Law and Economics, pp. 206-235, 208 
considers that such decisions should be “neither the subject of an obligation (created by agreement or 
otherwise) nor subject to coercive pressures from external sources”. By doing so, he only takes into 
account emulation as the main mechanism of diffusion if one is to focus on “policy convergence”. We 
do not agree with this narrow definition of convergence for the simple reason that the incentives driving 
policy convergence may be broader than the emulation process of policy diffusion. It may certainly cover 
socialisation, externalities and learning. In our view even externalities flowing from coercion should be 
included, as it is quite difficult to distinguish situations in which the presumed coercee acquiesces after 
her/his incentives have been altered, in some way, by the coercer. NOZICK, Robert, ‘Coercion’, in P. 
Suppes, and M. White (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, 
(Sidney Morgenbesser, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), 440–472, 441-445 offers a broad definition 
of coercion that includes any alteration of the coercee’s costs and benefits to acting, coercion finally 
operating through the will of the coercee. If one takes such definition of coercion, how would this be 
distinguishable from the situation in which the State found “coerced” has merely made the choice of 
adopting and implementing competition law as a result of the pattern of diffusion of other externalities 
or socialisation? 
36 SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie, A New World Order: Government Networks and the Disaggregated State 
(Princeton University Press, 2004). 
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is perceived as a process, encompassing “measures designed to abolish 
discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states”, as well 
as a state of affairs, represented by “the absence of various forms of discrimination 
between national economies”37. The concept of “policy convergence” as it has been 
conceived in the debate over the global governance of competition law, seems to 
adhere to the same aim, albeit using different means: the voluntary decision to move 
to the desired end-point without this being done through cooperation, integration or 
more generally “authority-legitimacy transfer or sharing” in the area of competition law.  
The concept of “policy convergence” is put forward as an essential aim for the 
global governance of antitrust, a number of strategies and mechanisms being 
suggested in order to achieve this objective and going from the impossible dream of 
elaborating a global supranational authority applying one competition law, to the 
collective cross-fertilization among various competition authorities through specific 
networks of informal interactions,  or the elaboration of bilateral or regional dispute 
resolution and appeal mechanisms38. The claim for policy convergence relies on the 
conceptual linkage made between competition law and international trade and the idea 
that “there is a risk that competition law enforcement can itself be employed as a tool 
of discrimination or market exclusion, contrary to the values it is intended to 
promote”39.  
Policy convergence in the area of competition law is thus promoted as a way to 
erode inter-jurisdictional trade barriers, a reason that looks at first sight extraneous to 
considerations of effective competition law enforcement. Policy convergence is often 
an aim explicitly pursued by trade agreements, in particular the deeper forms of 
international economic integration. One may note the importance of “regulatory 
convergence” and “regulatory compatibility” in the negotiations for the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership and the ongoing Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
negotiations between the European Commission and the US40. Each of these mega-
                                                          
37 BALASSA, Béla, The Theory of Economic Integration (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1961), p. 1. For a 
more ‘outcome-oriented’ definition see, TINBERGEN, Jan, International Economic Integration (Elsevier, 
1954), p. 95, defining integration as ‘the creation of the most desirable structure of internationa l 
economy, removing artificial hindrances to the optimal operation and introducing deliberately all 
desirable elements of co-ordination or unification’. 
38 For an overview of the various proposals, see PEREZ MOTTA, Eduardo (2016), Competition Policy 
and Trade in the Global Economy: Towards an Integrated Approach, The E15 Initiative, World 
Economic Forum, available at http://e15initiative.org/publications/competition-policy-trade-global-
economy-towards-integrated-approach/ . 
39 Ibid., p. 6. 
40 Further examples of these “deep” mega-trade agreements, include the EU Korea FTA, the US Korea 
FTA, the EU Singapore FTA. One may also cite the Australia-New Zealand regulatory cooperation and 
the US-Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council. The US-Canada have also put in place the US-
Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council which was created in 2011 by the US President and the 
Canadian Prime Minister, thus not resulting from an international trade agreement. It aims at better 
alignment in regulation, enhancing mutual recognition of regulatory practices and establishing new 
effective regulations in specific sectors. It is composed of high-level representatives of regulatory 
oversight bodies as well as senior representatives from the international trade departments, but other 
regulatory agencies are also involved. 
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trade agreements include in addition to the traditional for trade agreements market 
access rules, regulatory “behind the border” issues involving foreign direct investment, 
intellectual property rights, labour standards, as well as competition rules. These are 
usually accompanied by horizontal provisions on “regulatory compatibility” and 
“regulatory convergence”41. For instance, the EU/Canada Comprehensive Trade and 
Economic Agreement will include “horizontal” regulatory cooperation provisions in 
order to “prevent and eliminate unnecessary barriers to trade and investment”, 
“regulatory compatibility, recognition of equivalence, and convergence”, including 
“(b)uilding trust, deepening mutual understanding of regulatory governance” and 
“reducing unnecessary differences in regulation”, among other similar objectives42. 
Similar provisions may be included in the TTIP. The EU Negotiators Mandate calls for 
“enhanced cooperation between regulators” and “regulatory compatibility”43. A Section 
on Regulatory Policy Instruments provides for some harmonization of “analytical tools” 
such as Impact Assessments. It is envisaged that a bilateral cooperation mechanism 
will support regulatory cooperation with the aim to “seek increased compatibility 
between their respective regulatory frameworks”. This will include information and 
regulatory exchanges “led by the regulators and competent authorities at central level 
responsible for the regulatory acts concerned”. A specific provision on the promotion 
of “International Regulatory Cooperation” stipulates that “the Parties agree to co-
operate between themselves, and with third countries, with a view to strengthening, 
developing and promoting the implementation of international instruments inter alia by 
presenting joint initiatives, proposals and approaches in international  bodies or fora, 
especially in areas where regulatory exchanges have been initiated or concluded 
pursuant to this Chapter and in areas covered by [specific or sectoral provisions –to 
be identified] of this Agreement,”44. 
The competition law provisions of the draft TTIP agreement do not include any 
talk of convergence as such. However, one of the purposes of 1991 EU/US 
cooperation agreement in this area was to “lessen the possibility or impact of 
differences between the Parties in the application of their competition laws”45. What is 
relatively new in TTIP is the addition of consultation provisions and the possibility of 
                                                          
41 KRSTIC, Stanko S. (2012), Regulatory cooperation to remove non-tariff barriers to trade in products: 
key challenges and opportunities for the Canada-EU comprehensive Trade Agreement (CETA), Legal 
issues of Economic Integration, 39(1), pp. 3-28; HOEKMAN, Bernard (2015), Fostering Transatlantic 
Regulatory Cooperation and Gradual Multilateralization, Journal of International Economic Law, 18, pp. 
609-624  
42 EU Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) formally proposed by the 
European Commission for adoption by the Council of the EU in July 2016, Chapter 26 on Regulatory 
Cooperation, available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-
acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/26.aspx?lang=eng . 
43  See the current EU proposals on Regulatory Cooperation, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154377.pdf . 
44 See, https://wikileaks.org/ttip/Regulatory-Cooperation/Regulatory-Cooperation.pdf . 
45 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the 
European Communities regarding the application of their competition laws, [1995] OJ L 95/47, Art. 1(1). 
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adopting best practices. It is reminded that the EU-US cooperation in competition law 
is quite advanced, the Administrative Arrangements on Attendance (AAA)46 enabling 
reciprocal attendance at certain stages of the procedures in individual cases and the 
2011 EU/US Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations providing rules 
on the coordination on timing issues, exchange of information/collection and 
evaluation of evidence, joint EU/US interviews of the companies concerned, the 
establishment of key points for direct contacts between enforcers, and cooperation in 
the remedial process47. 
The idea is that once regulatory systems develop some form of “convergence”, 
based, for instance, on a common reliance on similar sources of scientific expertise 
and similar regulatory processes, international cooperation in order to promote a 
common interpretation and understanding of that expert body of knowledge, the 
reasons for regulatory diversity erode. Whatever one may think of the view that similar 
inputs of expert knowledge, with some degree of regulatory cooperation and regulatory 
process convergence, will lead to similar regulatory outputs, it is clear that such an 
approach aims to kick-start the process of inter-state regulatory cooperation in order 
to reduce “unnecessary differences” in regulation and achieve “regulatory 
compatibility”.  
However, as with the narrow view of economic integration, the main difficulty 
with this conceptualization of “policy convergence” is that it does not accommodate 
the need for regulatory pluralism and diversity, which might better represent the 
preferences of the various political communities connected through the nexus of global 
markets (and global supply chains). By focusing on the demands of specific 
stakeholders, businesses eager to expand their activities in global markets, the narrow 
definition of “policy convergence” as the process through which the convergence point 
of the “NPT-based model” of competition law will be achieved, may face a similar 
legitimacy crisis than that suffered in recent years by the neo-functionalist integration 
model, at least in the EU.  
One may not necessarily view institutional choices from a welfare perspective, 
in the sense that a particular institution produces superior welfare effects than another 
one, but also from a participatory perspective, regarding the quality and extent of 
participation in the decision-making processes at issue48. One needs to take into 
account the interests of all parties affected.  
Despite the frequent pleas of competition policy makers around the world and 
global business for convergence, the process of convergence remains highly 
                                                          
46 See, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/usa.html . 
47 See, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/best_practices_2011_en.pdf 
48 KOMESAR, Neil, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics and Public Policy, 
(University of Chicago Press, 1997).   
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contentious 49 . From a descriptive perspective, convergence appears like an 
unrealizable dream. The recourse to economic analysis and the role of economics in 
enhancing policy convergence in this area has been duly highlighted50, and certainly 
many competition law regimes make use of economic methodologies and policy 
frameworks put in place by the “global profession” of economics51. Various soft law 
texts, guidelines and best practices published by competition authorities aim to elevate 
economics’ driven evidence-based decision-making at the rank of best practice at the 
global scale52. However, expecting the same economic inputs to produce similar legal 
outputs would be ignoring the importance of legal process in the assessment and 
reliance on evidence, as well as the complex interaction between economic and legal 
concepts.  
An interesting feature of economic transplants is that their interpretation is not 
always a function of the exact meaning of the concept in economics. In that sense, 
they share a common characteristic with the concept of “legal transplants”53. The 
economic transplant takes a different form as soon as it is translated into the legal 
context: its content evolves separately than in its original setting, economics, as it 
evolves in congruence with the context of its host language, the specific legal system, 
and some would also claim, is heavily influenced by the politics and the culture of the 
specific jurisdiction to which it is introduced. Indeed, as some authors put it, “the law 
today not only interprets the social impacts of science” but also “constructs” the very 
environment in which scientific discourse comes to have “meaning, utility, and force”54. 
For this reason, even if EU competition law has moved towards the integration of 
economic analysis in the development of its standards of adjudication, in particular for 
horizontal and vertical contractual restraints, and largely relies on the same economics 
than those relied upon by the US antitrust agencies and courts, there are still 
significant differences with regard to some types of practices, such as vertical resale 
price maintenance for instance, which is unequivocally condemned in EU competition 
law, but assessed under the more lenient rule of reason in US antitrust law, probably 
                                                          
49 See, inter alia, CHENG, Thomas K. (2012), Convergence and Its Discontents: A Reconsideration of 
the Merits of Convergence of Global Competition Law, Chicago Journal of International Law, 12(2), pp. 
433-490. 
50 GERBER, David J., Global competition law convergence: Potential roles for economics, in Theodore 
Eisenberg and Giovanni B. Ramello (eds.), Comparative Law and Economics, pp. 206-235, 226-234. 
51 FOURCADE, Marion (2006), The Construction of a Global Profession: The Transnationalization of 
Economics, American Journal of Sociology, 112(1), pp. 145-194. 
52 See, DG Comp, Best practices, submission of economic evidence (2010) 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_best_practices/best_practice_submissions.pdf; 
Bundeskartellamt, Best practices for expert economic opinion 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/Merkblaetter/Bekanntmachung_Standards_
Englisch_final.pdf ; European Commission, Practical Guide on quantifying harm in actions for damages 
based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2013), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_guide_en.pdf . 
53 On the concept of “economic transplant” see, LIANOS, Ioannis (2009), Lost in Translation'? Towards 
a Theory of Economic Transplants, Current Legal Problems, pp. 346-404. 
54 JASANOFF, Sheila, Science at the Bar (Harvard Univ. Press, 1997), 16. 
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representing deep-rooted differences with regard to the assumptions made as to the 
operation of markets, thus affecting the choice of economic models attempting to 
explain the competitive interactions occurring in this context55. 
There has been a considerable effort the last two decades to build international 
institutions that would not only carry the message of policy convergence, but will also 
put in place policy convergence building tools, such as training and capacity building 
programmes, a set of best practices for competition authorities, an intense production 
of expert consensus reports, conferences and global symposia bringing together 
competition officials and a selected group of academics and representatives of the 
“stakeholders”, including global corporations, global law firms and economic 
consultancies. This effort followed the failure of the Doha round to establish a global 
institutional architecture for competition policy in the context of the WTO, a project 
mainly supported by the EU56. The US has opposed the WTO option57 and suggested 
instead a light institutional option, confined in the area of competition law and not linked 
with the broader trade issues covered by the WTO, with the establishment of a global 
network of competition authorities, what later became the ICN58. There are of course 
other important players that pre-existed the resurgence of the global competition policy 
discussion in the mid-1990s with the Doha Development Agenda. This includes the 
OECD, a club of developed economies that has recently moved in integrating 
emergent economies (in particular in South America with the inclusion of Chile in 2010) 
and has adopted a strategy of “inclusive growth” that has the potential to bring within 
the competition law remit issues, such as inequality, that were until then considered 
as not directly related to the considerations normally driving the work of competition 
authorities59. Initially the champion of a New International Economic Order in the 
1970s and 1980s60, and for this reason relatively marginalized in the discussion, 
                                                          
55 Compare Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 US 877, 877 (2007) with Article 
4(a) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices 
[2010] L 102/1 and Commission Notice - Guidelines Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C-130/1, paras 48 & 
223. 
56 Competition policy formed part of the so called Doha Development Agenda launched in 2001, and 
initiated by the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1996. For a discussion of this initiative and the 
need to re-launch the WTO option, see  ANDERSON Robert D. & MULLER Anna Caroline, Competition 
Law/Policy and the Multilateral Trading System: A Possible Agenda for the Future,  E15 Expert Group 
on  Competition Policy and the Trade System (September 2015), available at http://e15initiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/E15-Competition-Anderson-and-Muller-FINAL.pdf ; see also EVENETT, 
Simon J. (2007). Five Hypotheses Concerning the Fate of the Singapore Issues in the Doha Round. 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 23(3), pp. 392–414. 
57 See, KLEIN, Joel I. (1996), A Note of Caution with Respect to a WTO Agenda on Competition Policy.” 
Remarks to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 18 Nov., http://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
public/speeches/0998.htm  
58 For a discussion, see GERBER, David, Global Competition: Law, Markets and Globalization (OUP, 
2010), p. 105. 
59  See, OECD Strategy on Development, available at 
https://www.oecd.org/pcd/OECD%20Development%20Strategy.pdf ;  
60  For a discussion, see LIANOS, Ioannis (2007), The Contribution of the United Nations to the 
Emergence of Global Antitrust Law, Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law, 15(2), 415. 
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UNCTAD has recently re-calibrated its action to more “mainstream” competition law 
positions, albeit always geared towards the defense of the interests of developing 
countries, and tasks of capacity building and technical assistance61. Its new function 
in this emerging global competition law institutional framework is apparently to serve 
as an “efficient middleman between technical assistance donors and the youngest 
competition agencies that are most in need of improving their technical staff, 
investigation methodologies, and procedures”, to the direction of course of the NPT-
based model of competition law62.  
Despite the wide intervention and high visibility of these international platforms 
and undeniably the excellent work they have accomplished so far in terms of 
knowledge dissemination, the facilitation of the conversation with the development of 
a common language among competition authorities, as well as the establishment of 
various links between competition authorities globally, their potential to generate 
“policy convergence” is limited by various factors.  
First, it is clear that there are still important differences between competition law 
systems on the way the various common concepts, frameworks and tools generated 
by these international institutions and networks will be implemented in practice. As it 
was noted by Frederic Jenny, who has played a significant role in the global discussion 
on competition law since the mid-1990s in his capacity as the Chair of the WTO 
Competition and Trade Working group and as the head of the Competition Policy 
Committee at the OECD, with regard to substantive convergence in merger control, 
notwithstanding the important progress made in the generation of substantive 
convergence, “the convergence of national merger control regimes across the world, 
if desirable, is unlikely to lead to the complete homogeneity of merger control regimes," 
with Jenny continuing that "the convergence of merger control regimes cannot 
guarantee that there will be no conflicts or divergence of results"63.  
Second, we have witnessed the last two decades the emergence of new 
competition law regimes of global significance, in view of the importance of the 
economy of these States for global trade, such as China, India, Brazil, Russia, South 
Africa, Mexico and Turkey. Some of these regimes have been, and to a certain degree 
still are, closely related to the EU mainly, but also the US competition law models, but 
as they mature, these “new” competition law systems tend to develop independently 
from their “parent” jurisdictions. Following adoption most competition law regimes pass 
by a process of soul-searching, which integrates the specificities of their economies, 
                                                          
61  See, UNCTAD Perspective on Competition Law and Policy 2013, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditcclpmisc2013d2_en.pdf (arguing that competition policy 
should be suited to their development needs and economic situation). 
62 PEREZ MOTTA, Eduardo (2016), Competition Policy and Trade in the Global Economy: Towards an 
Integrated Approach, The E15 Initiative, World Economic Forum, available at 
http://e15initiative.org/publications/competition-policy-trade-global-economy-towards-integrated-
approach/ . 
63 JENNY, Frederic (2015), Substantive convergence in merger control: An assessment, 2015-1, pp 25-
41. 
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institutional capabilities and cultural baggage in the development of the law. It is 
inevitable that, once the initial steps of implementing the model have passed, the 
emerging competition law communities of these jurisdictions will aim to produce 
knowledge that will represent the interests of their constituents, or stakeholders, and 
to project that globally, in their effort to shape globalization according to their national 
interests and the demands of their political economy. Hence, the phase of initial 
convergence to the original “model” may be followed by a phase of divergence, once 
the economic, legal and political cultural specificities start kicking in.  
Third, the global economy has substantially changed, with the global share of 
the US and EU, shrinking from 60% in 2003 to approximately 45% in 2013 at the same 
time as the BRICS witnessed their share tripling during this period. Despite the recent 
drop in the growth rates of the BRICS economies, some economists predict that 
growth in emergent economies, in particular BRICS, will considerably increase their 
share of the global economy64. A recent OECD report explains that  
“(i)n 1995, the US, EU and Japan accounted for about two thirds of world GDP 
– and about 95% of the GDP of countries with competition law. Consequently, 
co-operation among just these three jurisdictions would have covered almost 
all significant international antitrust matters. In 2014 that same trilateral co-
operation would cover less than half of world GDP. By 2030 on reasonable 
projections, those three economies will account for only 35% of world GDP. 
Beyond 2030, at least five jurisdictions would have to co-operate to reach the 
proportion of world GDP which could be achieved with just trilateral co-
operation in 1995. Of course to reach 95% of those covered by competition law, 
one would need to include probably a hundred jurisdictions”65. 
This renders compliance to competition law a much trickier exercise, as an 
undertaking entering into transnational activities, for instance a M&A, will need even 
more now to pro-actively take into account the competition law regimes of the most 
important economies globally. This enhances the leverage of the competition 
authorities of the BRICS in the global governance of competition law and policy, in 
comparison to their position ten years ago.  
Fourth, one of the most important in terms of political and economic significance 
jurisdictions in the world, China, is conspicuously absent from the main fora advancing 
the global discussion in competition law and policy, namely the ICN and the OECD. 
This has obviously an impact on the legitimacy in terms of representativeness and the 
clout of the work accomplished in these fora at a global scale, as it is increasingly clear 
that ICN and the OECD represent mainly the views of an important, but not dominant 
any more, part of the global competition law community.  
                                                          
64 SPENCE, Michael, The Next Convergence: The Future of Economic Growth in a Multispeed World 
(Picador, 2012). 
65 OECD, Challenges of International Co-operation in Competition Law Enforcement (2014), available 
at https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Challenges-Competition-Internat-Coop-2014.pdf , pp. 50-51. 
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Fifth, it becomes clear that the ideological consensus emerging out of the 
roaring mid-1990s and early 2000s that formed the basis for the emergence of the 
global order for competition law and policy during this period is increasingly under 
intense scrutiny and eventually contestation. In many of the core/model jurisdictions 
there is an increasing concern over the lack of competition that the sole focus of 
antitrust laws on economic efficiency has led to and its impact on the rise of 
inequalities66. 
It becomes clear that the soft international architecture put in place in the area 
of competition law and policy has trouble to cope with this multi-polar reality. While 
one may regret the absence of a “view from the top”67, policy convergence being an 
important and legitimate demand from business, it is clear that the array of interests 
participating in the discussion over the governance of global antitrust is fairly limited 
and that little effort has been made to re-think the adequacy of the “NPT-based model” 
of antitrust put forward by these global institutions and networks in view of the lessons 
of the global economic crisis and the important changes brought in by the 
technological developments of the “fourth industrial revolution” and the rising 
significance of new centers of power globally. It is important that the quest for “policy 
convergence” does not lead to the impoverishment of the debate over global 
competition law by excluding different points of view, which challenge the dominant 
“NPT-based model” and by artificially narrowing down the debate (for instance by 
excluding from the discussion themes that may generate disagreements, such as the 
role of inclusive growth or inequality considerations in competition law enforcement), 
as these are perceived as putting obstacles to policy convergence. It is also crucial 
that the current architecture of global governance in this area represents the role and 
weight of all significant global players, in particular the BRICS economies. One cannot 
dis-embed policy convergence in the area of competition law from the political and 
social structure underpinning the global economy, and the ability of various 
sociological categories (e.g. small and medium undertakings, consumers, employees, 
governments), whose interests are affected, to participate in the decision-making 
process68. Hence, there is need to re-embed the discussion on the global governance 
                                                          
66 See, for instance, the Council of Economic Advisors’ Brief to the US President, April 2016, available 
at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf 
followed by the launch of a new initiative of the US president to promote competition, see 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/15/executive-order-steps-increase-competition-
and-better-inform-consumers . 
67 See the suggestions of FOX, Eleanor (2015) Antitrust Without Borders: From Roots to Codes to 
Networks, November 2015, available at http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-
Competition-Fox-FINAL.pdf . 
68 On the importance of the concept of embededdness in understanding the (global) economy, and in 
particular the starting point that economic actions are “embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social 
relations”, see M. Granovetter (1985), Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embededdness, American Journal of Sociology, 91, pp. 481-510, 482-483. 
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of competition law to the multi-polar dimension of the global marketplace and the 
pluralistic nature of global governance as well as the international legal order. 
 
C. Re-Embedding the discussion on the global governance of 
competition law to the multi-polar global economy and global legal 
pluralism 
 
The original Havana Charter, establishing the WTO and including a chapter on 
competition law69, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) ad hoc 
committee on the drafting of an international code for restrictive business practices in 
the early 1950s (which again failed because of lack of support from the US)70, the 
proposal of a Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC), prepared by an “International 
Antitrust Working Group”, a unique initiative of a group of antitrust scholars to pave 
the way towards international enforcement of free and open markets 71 , that has 
inspired the European Commission’s proposals leading to the inclusion of competition 
as one of the Singapore matters to be negotiated in Doha, which also failed, provide 
some glimpses of an international law approach to the governance of global 
competition law. Some proposals made to integrate “cosmopolitan” principles in 
national competition law enforcement may also be considered as animated by similar 
principles72. 
Despite its great theoretical appeal, it is unclear how an international law 
framework may be achievable at this stage of the development of the global antitrust 
law enterprise. It becomes however important to recognize that the development of 
global markets is intrinsically linked to the existence of a set of international or 
transnational legal norms that support them. These either emanate from traditional 
international law norms, resulting from International treaties or international customary 
law, negotiated or accepted by the States, or by a body of transnational commercial 
law which in a significant part constitutes an archetype of global law without a State 
and has moved from the state of “an amorphous and flexible soft law to an established 
                                                          
69 Chapter V of the Havana Charter of 1948 expressed a concern for the restrictive effect of some 
business practices, without however adopting the more active approach proposed by the United States 
and the United Kingdom in their 1945 Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment. 
However, the proposals never took effect, the United States Department of State publicly withdrew its 
request for ratification by the United States Congress. 
70 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Off. Rec., 16th Sess., Supp. No. II, U.N. Doc. No.E/2380 
(1953). For a detailed analysis, see TIMBERG, Sigmund (1953), Restrictive Business Practices: 
Comparative Legislation and the Problems That Lie Ahead, 2 American Journal of Comparative Law, 
445, 463-64; FURNISH, Dale B. (1970), A Transnational Approach to Restrictive Business Practices, 4 
International Lawyer. 317, 327. 
71  Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement (International 
Antitrust Code Working Group Proposed Draft 1993), published and released July 10, 1993, 64 Antitrust 
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628 (Aug. 19, 1993) (Special Supp.). 
72 FOX, Eleanor M (2000)., Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and Sideways, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781, 1801. 
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system of law with codified legal rules”73. Various linkages are in operation, between 
States and State-sponsored global institutions, between private actors operating 
across national borders, and between State actors and private actors. Although 
ordered by well accepted legal principles and methodologies this global legal “field”74 
is of course characterized by a significant degree of diversification and a pluralistic 
legal order75.  
As the diversity of linkages and legal pluralism characterize the current status of 
the governance of global markets, it should not be a surprise that the global 
governance of antitrust should also be theorized through similar lenses. The multi-
polar nature of the global economy calls for a multi-polar setting in the global 
governance of competition law. The emergence of various centers of competition law 
decision-making globally should not be perceived as a curse, a mere nuisance in the 
necessary drive towards policy convergence, but as an expression of the pluralism of 
the global legal order regulating global markets and of the changing constellation of 
power in the global economy. Legal pluralism and multi-polarity will inevitably 
constitute the essential features of the global governance of antitrust.  
The legal pluralism and multi-polarity characterizing global markets calls for a 
framework that seeks to engage the various interests affected by the emergence of 
global antitrust in the emerging global field of competition law. Prioritizing the demands 
of global business for policy convergence, without any analysis of the way other 
interests may be affected by the process, is a recipe for a legitimacy disaster that the 
nascent framework of global governance in the antitrust field may not afford, in view 
of the recent rise of populism and mistrust to the elites. Competition officials promoting 
global policy convergence as a way to promote a global competition law culture should 
be cautious in the support they receive in this effort by the global business community, 
whose interests in a world of more than 120 competition law regimes, seem naturally 
aligned with their own, with regard to the outcome sought, greater convergence, 
although the reasons each of these groups aims to achieve such convergence 
essentially differ. Accepting legal pluralism and multi-polarity does not however mean 
that one needs to sacrifice efficiency concerns. It is important to acknowledge that the 
quality and extent of participation may be a proxy for the efficiency of the specific 
institutional process.  
Neil Komesar notably advanced a “participation-centered” approach seeking to 
avoid the fallacy of one-sided interest group analysis. This aims to account for all 
affected groups in various dimensions and to examine how the distribution of benefits 
                                                          
73 MICHAELS, Ralf (2007), The True Lex Mercatoria: Law beyond the State, Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies, 14 (2), pp. 447-468 
74 As explained earlier, the concept of “field” used here has a sociological connotation and does not 
refer to a specific area of law or discipline. 
75  On “transnational legal pluralism”, see ZUMBANSEN, Peer (2012), Defining the Space of 
Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance, and Legal Pluralism. Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems 21(2): 305-336. 
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and costs of action would affect the ability of different groups to get what they want via 
the different institutions 76 . From this perspective, both the over-representation of 
minority interests but also of majority interests might lead to unsatisfactory results. 
According to this theory, it is important to focus on the factors determining a group’s 
marginal cost of participation. An affected group or interest participates on a given 
issue when its benefits (the group’s average per capita stakes) exceed their costs. In 
Komesar’s “participation- centered” model, “information costs” and “organization 
costs” determine a group’s participation costs. The first refer to the costs of learning 
the law and procedures applicable as well as the costs for the specific institution to 
gather information. The organization costs facing a group are the costs to be incurred 
by the members who want to take action, and want other members to contribute. 
Organization costs increase with group size. The size of each member’s individual 
stake — how much she stands to gain from winning — also affects her inclination to 
organize her fellow members. It follows that organization costs rise as individual stakes 
decrease.  
Institutional processes can be biased in two ways: a “minority bias” when a 
small group with high individual stakes (e.g. multi-nationals) convinces an institution 
to enact its preferred policy and by doing so inflicts a greater cost on a large group 
with lower individual stakes (e.g. consumers) than the benefit it obtains 77 , or a 
“majoritarian bias” when a large group with low individual stakes prevails and thereby 
inflicts a greater cost on a small, high-stakes group than the benefit it obtains78. Once 
a dispute has been identified, the goal of comparative institutional analysis would thus 
be to find the institution least likely to develop a minority or majoritarian bias, that is, 
the institution where the group with the highest total stake is most likely to win. 
If we follow this theoretical framework, the choice of an adequate institutional 
arrangement for the global governance of antitrust may require a fine balancing 
exercise between minority interests, such as global corporations that have high stakes 
in view of the existence of more than one hundred competition laws to which they are 
expected to comply, and majority interests, such as consumers, that may benefit from 
multilateral competition law enforcement (in the form of additional deterrence). It is 
however also true that the marginal benefit provided by the enforcement of an 
additional competition law may be minimal and in any case decline at some deterrence 
point, or even lead to consumer harm, in case this additional competition law 
enforcement stifles innovation and thus affects long term consumer benefits (over-
enforcement risks). 
Because of its design and the prevalent role it provides to the US and EU 
competition law models, the institutional setting of “policy convergence” may suffer 
from a minority bias, as it may not accommodate the interests of large groups, such 
                                                          
76 Ibid., p. 8. 
77 Ibid., p. 55. 
78 Ibid., p. 77. 
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as small and medium undertakings in the Global South that seek access to global 
markets and global value chains in order to upgrade their economic potential; farmers 
that may see their profits squeezed by powerful buyers established in the Global North; 
or consumers of the emergent and developing economies that may suffer from export 
cartels, increasing global concentration in various product markets and powerful global 
monopolies. At the same time, subjecting multinational corporations to the scrutiny of 
an extensive network of competition authorities that apply different standards and 
principles in assessing their practices may be a source of majoritarian bias and lead 
to inefficiency. As none of these solutions preserves us from majoritarian and 
minoritarian biases, it becomes important to think of alternative institutional settings, 
which will lead to a balanced and vigorous engagement by a broad spectrum of 
affected interests in the decision-making process. This participation-centered process 
may provide the exploratory tool needed in order to allow for cross-institutional 
comparisons by enabling us to understand the capabilities of an institution to bring out 
the diversity of interests affected by global competition law enforcement and engage 
the various stakeholders in a balanced way. Each affected group should have access 
to the decision-making process and a voice, for the process to be judged legitimate. 
At the same time, the representation of various interests will provide the chosen 
institution with a more complete base of information from which to make decisions, 
thus enhancing its accountability. 
Turning to the architecture of the global governance of competition law, it is clear 
that individual countries, in particular jurisdictions with a “low externalities” competition 
law enforcement potential, because of the small size of their market, will incur 
difficulties to have their voice heard, certainly in the current context where only a few 
jurisdictions may take decisions and impose remedies to global corporations, but also 
in the event of a regime of policy convergence engineered by the existing international 
institutions involved in this area that mostly represent the interests and views about 
economic development of the US, the EU and a few other industrialised economies.  
Some affected interests/groups seem also excluded from consideration by the existing 
institutional setting (e.g. employees, farmers, small and medium undertakings), the 
latter being essentially consumers-focused.  
While it may not be possible to design international institutions that may achieve 
the representation and participation of all interests, a second best would be to 
constitute a global deliberative space to which the interests of the emergent and 
developing countries, which form now the majority of the States disposing competition 
law systems, as well as those of all affected interests from global competition law 
enforcement, will be adequately represented. This global deliberative space will aim 
to be more inclusive and transparent than the current one, to which global 
corporations, transnational law firms and economic consultancies seem to be over-
represented, and to guarantee the access of a diversity of affected interests to 
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information and expertise that would enable them to assess their positioning with 
regard to the various proposals made. 
As the BRICS “club” is becoming one of the most important platforms for 
establishing a multi-polar, and inclusive, global governance, along with other inter-
governmental settings, such as G20, it seems natural that it should play an important 
role in the effort to constitute this global deliberative space in competition law and 
policy. This “participation-centered” approach breaks with the realist perspective of 
global policy convergence engineered by powerful coalitions of the willing and their 
followers. It also differs from the cosmopolitan view, in the sense that it recognizes the 
difficulties of a larger community to preserve individual autonomy, as significant 
increases in the number of jurisdictions of competition law and the increasing 
complexity of the area (in view of the rise of the economics-based NPT-model of 
competition law) alter the dynamics of participation and reduce the likelihood of 
adequate representation of the various affected interests. It remains also different from 
an “internationalist” approach that would engage only with States and would ignore 
various other affected interests that may not have gained influence in the domestic 
political arena to make their concerns adequately represented.  
From a participation-centered perspective, global governance will not seek policy 
convergence for its own sake but will aim to promote greater levels of trust among the 
various States but also other actors involved in this “field”: competition authorities and 
national bureaucracies, businesses, consumers and other interests. 
 
D. Global governance as promoting total trust 
 
Contrary to those calling for policy convergence as such, which is, as we previously 
highlighted, linked to the view that regulatory diversity constitutes a problem that needs 
to be tackled by global governance, in view of its effects on global markets, I consider 
that this approach may negate any space to legal pluralism and regulatory diversity. If 
the objective is regulatory convergence or compatibility, the different governance 
arrangements that may emerge are provisional steps towards the ineluctable end-
game of the convergence point of the “NPT-based” competition law model. I do not 
consider that global governance means engineering policy convergence, but argue, to 
the contrary, that this concept should be carefully distinguished from that of policy 
convergence.  
Our starting point is that the usual rationale for organizing a global governance 
regime is to manage tensions between different legal systems, not necessarily to unify 
legal systems into one indistinguishable one, although this might also be considered 
an option among others. The frictions between the various systems of competition law 
that interact with each other when dealing with conduct producing effects in a foreign 
jurisdiction generate negative policy externalities. These externalities may take 
different forms as the following stylized examples show. First, the consumers of the 
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host State (where the products are sold) may be affected by an agreement or a merger 
between two undertakings in the home State (where the undertakings are situated). 
By implementing its competition law extraterritorially, and prohibiting the agreement or 
merger, the host State may protect its consumers, but it may also affect the objectives 
pursued by the home State, which may find that this agreement or merger produces 
efficiency gains for its economy, or promotes another policy objective that is not taken 
into account by the competition law of the host State and is on balance positive from 
a public policy perspective. Secondly, the home State may not implement its 
competition law against anticompetitive conduct that exclusively aims at a foreign 
market (e.g. export cartel), that of the host State, which may not be able to get hold of 
the evidence and may not dispose of adequate competition assessment or remedial 
capabilities to tackle this anticompetitive practice. Thirdly, one may imagine that 
competition law enforcement by a variety of jurisdictions may lead to overlaps and 
unnecessary duplication, thus raising the costs of compliance for business and limiting 
the occurrence of beneficial to the global economy transactions. Fourthly, certain 
economically powerful States may finish by establishing global standards for the 
enforcement of competition law, as because of the sheer size and significance of their 
market, it will be impossible for businesses to ignore them, without taking in due 
consideration the policy preferences of other less powerful States.  
It is theoretically possible for each State to adopt unilaterally measures in order to 
mitigate the negative policy externalities by either actively implementing negative and 
positive comity principles, that is by refraining to use its competition enforcement 
authority when this may be more important for the foreign nation than the exercise of 
authority would be for the specific State,79 or by adopting a cosmopolitan standard that 
internalises policy preferences and interests foreign to its domestic policy calculus80. 
Despite the appeal these option may exercise, their implementation in the current 
political and economic context seems impractical, in view of the clear accountability 
and legitimacy lines of competition authorities which report to national governments 
and national Parliaments, and not to supranational constituencies, in particular as it is 
not clear what interests these represent, and because of the important costs of 
integrating concerns and policy choices which lie outside the clear boundaries of the 
domestic legal system (information gathering and processing costs, risks of 
misinterpretation due to the lack of expertise about the foreign legal system). In these 
instances, cooperation with the foreign jurisdiction would be a more effective option in 
order to deal with these negative policy externalities.  
The presence of negative policy externalities between different jurisdictions may 
lead to the need of some form of governance mechanism in order to mitigate the risk 
                                                          
79 See, in the US Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976). 
80 Testimony of Eleanor M. Fox before the Antitrust Modernization Commission Hearing on International 
Issues, Washington DC, February 15, 2006, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-
committees/at-ic/pdf/spring/06/012.pdf . 
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of these externalities occurring81. The risk of negative externalities becomes even 
more significant, the more transnational organization of production through global 
supply chains takes hold in the global economy. This governance mechanism may 
take different forms: from a centralising harmonization option to a regime of complete 
inter-jurisdictional competition enabling forum shopping. Contrary to what is advanced 
by those focusing on the unidimensional objective of policy convergence, I take the 
view that the establishment of a global governance architecture should not seek to 
enhance regulatory sameness or convergence, but to enhance the building of 
increased levels of “institutional-based” trust (or “system trust”) between “actors” 
interacting across national boundaries. 
One could identify two categories of trust relationships of relevance to our 
framework. First, one should enhance trust between different national regulators that 
interact as they try to resolve the conflicts arising out of the extraterritorial application 
of their national regulatory standards in cases of transnational dimension (“trust 
between governments”). Second, there should be trust between private actors 
(business, consumers, citizens) and the institutions that regulate their interactions 
(“trust in government”). This is a particularly important factor if one pays attention to 
the necessary legitimacy that national regulators (e.g. competition authorities) should 
enjoy in the performance of their tasks. Achieving policy convergence may harm the 
legitimacy of competition authorities if their constituents are critically disposed to the 
“economics-base model” of antitrust that serves as the convergence point. One should 
therefore aim to achieve increased levels of both trust between governments and trust 
in government (“total trust”).  
Actors are not only States, but also entities operating inside the black-box of the 
State: the various sociological groups, consumers, the general public, small and 
medium undertakings, shareholders of multi-national companies whose interests are 
usually taken into account by competition law. These actors operate within a specific 
(social) environment, which can be characterized by relations of competition, 
cooperation and co-opetition. Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside the 
social context: their action is instead, embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of 
social relations, in some instances, transnational ones. They dispose of the power to 
interact with other public or private actors across jurisdictions. This theory does not 
neglect the concept of the State, which is still present, as the interference of national 
boundaries defines the interactions between actors that are of interest for the 
existence of transnational negative externalities and therefore the need for a global 
                                                          
81 The existence of positive policy externalities, that is when a State implements its competition law 
statute and by doing so produces positive effects to the economy or the market of a foreign jurisdiction, 
does not necessarily call for the establishment of a governance mechanism. Policies that confer benefits 
on foreign groups in order to promote domestic policies, are often of little interest for international 
agreements, regimes or transnational cooperation. 
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governance architecture. Interactions between actors within the boundaries of a State 
are excluded from consideration.  
We turn now to the concept of “trust”. The term is employed in economics, 
organization theory and sociological literature in different ways.82 One could define 
trust as “an attitude involving a willingness to place the fate of one’s interests under 
the control of others”83. Repeated interaction forms the primary basis for trust. Andrew 
Kydd explains that  
“trust is a belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting 
one’s own cooperation, while mistrust is a belief that the other side prefers 
exploiting one’s cooperation to returning it. In other words, to be trustworthy, 
with respect to a certain person in a certain context, is to prefer to return their 
cooperation rather than exploit them. […] Cooperation between two actors will 
be possible if the level of trust each has for the other exceeds some threshold 
specific to the situation and the actors”84. 
Increasing the intensity (level) of trust refers “to the amount of discretion trustors 
grant trustees over their interests”85.  Indeed, “cooperation is possible when the level 
of trust for the other exceeds a minimum trust threshold for each party”, which “will 
depend on the party’s own tolerance for the risk of exploitation by the other side”86. 
Consequently, “to trust someone […] is to believe it relatively likely that they would 
prefer to reciprocate cooperation. To mistrust someone is to think it is relatively likely 
that they prefer to defect even if they think one will cooperate”87. The function of trust 
is to reduce uncertainty and complexity in social communication systems as “it allows 
for specific (rather than arbitrary) assumptions about other social actors’ future 
behaviour”88. It could thus be seen as a communicative medium reducing complexity89.  
Trust can take different forms: Luhmann distinguishes between “personal trust”, 
which is likely to develop when individual actors have frequent interactions and 
                                                          
82 See, LUHMANN, Niklas, Trust and Power (New York: John Wiley, 1979) for a discussion of trust from 
the point of view of systems theory; COLEMAN, Jules, Foundations of Social Theory (Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1990) for a discussion of trust from a rational theory perspective; WILLIAMSON, Oliver (1993), 
Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization, Journal of Law and Economics 453 for an economic 
perspective on trust. For sociological accounts of trust see, HARDIN, Russel, Trust (Russel Sage, 
1998) ; KRAMER, Roderick M. & TYLER, Tom R. (eds.) Trust in Organizations (Sage, 1996) ; BARBER, 
Bernard, The Logic and Limits of Trust (Rutgers Univ. Press, 1983); For the role of trust in international 
relations theory see, KYDD, Andrew, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton University 
Press, 2005).  
83  HOFFMANN, Aaron (2002), A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations, European 
Journal of International Relations, 8(3), pp. 376-377. 
84 KYDD, Andrew, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 
6. 
85 Ibid., p. 377. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88  BACHMANN, Reinhard (2001), Trust, Power and Control in Trans-Organizational Relations, 
Organization Studies, 22 pp. 337, also available at 
http://www.sase.org/oldsite/conf1999/papers/reinhard_bachmann.pdf , p. 8. 
89 LUHMANN, Niklas, Trust and Power, above, pp. 42-43. 
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become thus familiar with each other’s personal preferences and interests and thus 
indifferent to the institutional arrangements, and “system trust”, which relies on 
institutions to generate trust, rather than on personal interaction. Institutional-based 
trust constitutes a more “advanced stage of trust production”90 as its function is to 
generate trust in a massive scale. But trust produces also risk, in particular if there is 
limited available information about the future behaviour of the trustee. Risk is an 
unavoidable feature of trust because trust can be disappointed. For example, an offer 
of cooperation may be exploited by free riding, or not be reciprocated. There are thus 
two inter-related conditions for trust: risk and interdependence between the actors. In 
order to minimize the risk of defect, actors may develop various strategies.  
An alternative way than trust, to reduce complexity and uncertainty is the exercise 
of interaction power. Power influences “the selection of actions in the face of other 
possibilities”91. Power may not exclude risk but it may reduce it considerably: “a social 
actor who considers using power usually can refer to ‘authoritative’ and ‘allocative’ 
resources, which can be deemed likely to find recognition by the subordinate actor”92 
and thus affect its incentives to act. Hegemonic power by one State, or the fight for 
hegemony, has been a feature of many historical periods in human history 93 . If 
powerful actors have few constraints on the exercise of their power, our capacity for 
trust in them is limited. Power is treated here as a relational construct, which connotes 
the degree of dependence of the actors on one another. 
Actors are frequently found in situations where they have to decide if they would 
base their interaction/communication mostly on trust or on power and the proportions 
of trust and power which should govern their relationship. Trust and power should not 
be exclusively viewed, however, as alternatives. It is possible that power appears in a 
“de-personalised” form as “system power”. System power can take the form of law, 
organization or a hierarchy which can develop shared meanings among the social 
actors and can thus “mass-produce” trust. Standards of expertise are the main sources 
of “system trust”: they are integrated in organizational routines that may take the form 
of institutions (formal or informal). Institutions are thus the central precondition rather 
than an alternative to “system trust”. The constitution of trust ultimately relies on the 
existence of strong institutions. As institutional-based or system trust is a condition for 
the efficient production of a high level of trust, the “trans-organizational relations can 
be reconstructed as being controlled by the patterns of trust and/or power 
mechanisms”94.  
                                                          
90 BACHMANN, Reinhard (2001), Trust, Power and Control in Trans-Organizational Relations, above, 
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91 LUHMANN, Niklas, Trust and Power, above, p. 112. 
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It follows from this analysis that trust is a concept that takes significance in 
situations of uncertainty over the preferences or behaviour of interdependent actors in 
a specific social system. Its function is to reduce uncertainty and thus to induce 
welfare-enhancing cooperation between them. However, trust produces also risks 
when cooperation will be exploited or not returned. This will provoke mistrust, which 
could potentially dodge welfare-enhancing activity from happening. Power or 
hegemonic control would be the other side of the coin: it is alternative to trust and 
contributes to maintain control and avoid the slippery-slope to a Hobbesian state of 
anarchy. The establishment of informal or formal institutions constitutes another 
available option in order to mitigate the risk of distrust by creating “system trust”. 
Institutions will generate trust, as long as their constituents believe that they are 
effective in preventing situations of distrust. Institutions may also require the invention 
of a common grammar that will facilitate communication between the actors, the 
existence of a regime of sanctions for instances of mistrust or of a hierarchy that will 
exercise control over the action of the actors and will ensure that they are trustworthy 
(“system power”).   
In the sphere of international and transnational economy regulation, trust can be 
considered as an objective concept describing a relationship between regulatory 
systems underpinned by a relationship between public and private actors. The starting 
point is that when States interact, they have incomplete information about the 
preferences and objectives of their counterparts, as well as their payoffs and domestic 
pressures that are not evident to a counter-party. As it is also the case for individual 
relations, relations between states are shaped by social networks. Actions are 
embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations. Consequently, the 
behaviour of the actors is not only driven by a pure interest calculation (calculative 
trust) but also by social norms and formal and informal institutions that support the 
specific relationship.  
An important source of trust in this context would be the long history of interaction 
between these actors and their collective memory. Geographic proximity, common 
language, shared values and preferences facilitate interaction and thus build a certain 
level of “personal trust” between the different actors. The social network provides a 
source of information but at the same time it constitutes a mechanism that grants 
importance to “reputational sanctions”95. Reputation helps to determine whether an 
actor would risk cooperating with another one96. To the extent that all actors are 
connected in a web of relations, even if there is no personal interaction, there is some 
assurance that the victim of a trust violation can take action to rectify the situation. The 
development of mutual dependence between exchange partners may, however, have 
                                                          
95 GUZMAN, Andrew, How International Law Works – A Rational Choice Theory, (OUP, 2008), p. 33. 
96 On the value of reputation in international law see, GUZMAN, Andrew, How International Law Works 
– A Rational Choice Theory, (OUP, 2008), 71-117. 
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ambivalent results as it may promote trust but also foster opportunistic behaviour 
(mistrust). 
The network of social relations to which all actors belong provides not only a source 
of information about trustworthiness but also the opportunity for each actor to 
contribute to the reputation of another one, should other actors choose to provide 
information about a possible lack of trustworthiness. This reputational cost is 
particularly effective in closed social systems with membership, as is the case for 
instance of the European Union, or of the BRICS. 
There is, however, a point where “personal trust” is not sufficient to promote 
welfare-enhancing cooperation. The reason is that the more complex the relationship 
and its environment becomes, the more uncertainty is generated over the future 
actions of the actors. As actors attempt to deal with uncertainty and the risk of mistrust, 
they may find it necessary either to exercise hegemonic power, if they have the 
capacity to do so (interaction power), or to elaborate institutions that will control 
occurrences of distrust. Institutions will have as their function to generate “system 
trust”. They build on an existing level of trust, which is a necessary pre-condition for 
their existence. The reputation mechanism is one dimension of the story. Institutions 
will act as social networks implementing informal or formal mechanisms to address 
mistrust. These trust-building tools could take different forms: extensive 
communication and information exchange, joint work, monitoring, norms of exclusion 
in the case of closed groups, or credible commitments, such as the delegation of 
important tasks, for instance the investigation of anticompetitive conduct producing 
transnational effects, to the competition authority of the partner State(s).  
This brief sketch of a new theoretical framework based on the concept of trust may 
serve as a blueprint for a new model of global governance in the area of antitrust, 
based on multi-polarity and legal pluralism. We believe that because of their economic 
and political significance, the BRICS jurisdictions are able to take a leading role in 
moving the discussion away from the sterile and counter-productive insistence on 
policy convergence and towards the generation of total trust. 
 
III. The role of BRICS in the Global Governance of Competition Law 
 
The globalization of economic activity, in particular with the advent of the digital 
economy and the internationalisation of IP rights enabling global players to maintain 
the competitive advantage conferred by IP rights in their commercial activities across 
the globe, has increased the likelihood of competition law regimes colliding, as various 
competition authorities grapple with transnational anticompetitive conduct involving 
these global platforms. The role of BRICS competition authorities in the new 
geopolitics of competition law enforcement is particularly significant and will continue 
to grow, once their relatively more recent competition law regimes mature. From 
laggards and mainly followers of the trends set by the US and EU competition law 
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“models”, BRICS competition law regimes are increasingly finding a voice of their own 
and may eventually become trend setters in global antitrust. From this perspective, the 
recent investigations against Google’s alleged anticompetitive activities in mobile and 
search markets provide an illustration of the increasingly important role of BRICS in 
global competition law enforcement. This practical significance of their enforcement 
action withstanding, the BRICS have so far stayed mute with regard to the direction 
the global governance of competition law should move to. The main proposals on this 
crucial issue, of interest to the global economy, are indeed prepared in the established 
formal fora of ICN and OECD, with contributions from UNCTAD and the World Bank97, 
all of which are dominated to a certain extent by the US and the EU, as well as in more 
informal fora put in place by some global economic players, for instance the E15 
Initiative supported by the World Economic Forum98.  
It is clear that this constellation of established players in the global governance 
of antitrust game cannot be representative of the interests of the BRICS countries, in 
particular in view of the way these fora operate in practice, and more so of the 
emergent and developing jurisdictions that have now come to form the majority of 
competition law enforcers worldwide. Once this fact is accepted, it becomes essential 
to rethink the role of BRICS, not just as a “club” of significant, from the point of view of 
competition law enforcement, jurisdictions, but also as a major participant in the efforts 
to imagine a global architecture for competition law enforcement, but also as a trend-
setter in the area of competition law and policy. The existence of a BRICS “club” does 
not assume that these jurisdictions have common interests or present common 
characteristics that set them apart the US and the EU. It is clear that BRICS’ 
economies, societies and political systems are markedly different from each other and 
that the group is quite heterogeneous. However, these differences may be considered 
as a source of comparative advantage in the context of the present discussion: the 
global governance of competition law and the establishment of a global deliberative 
space. They enable the representation of a variety of interests, and “models” of 
competition law enforcement, the common thread here being legal pluralism. Hence, 
I do not consider that the heterogeneity of the BRICS’ club may constitute an obstacle 
to them gaining, as a group and/or individually, a more prominent role in the global 
governance of competition law. 
I propose the constitution of a BRICS Joint Research Platform that will be 
entrusted with the following tasks: (i) establish a common knowledge-base for 
competition law enforcement in these jurisdictions reflecting the specificities of their 
economies, social and institutional structures, culture, and vision for the role of 
                                                          
97 See, for instance, the recent event organised by the World bank in June 2015 on Promoting Effective 
Competition Policies for Shared Prosperity and Inclusive Growth, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2015/06/23/promoting-effective-competition-policies-for-shared-
prosperity-and-inclusive-growth . 
98 See, http://e15initiative.org/themes/competition-policy/ . 
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competition law, in the form of a global competition authorities/academia partnership; 
(ii)  increase trust between the various BRICS competition authorities, by providing 
them a platform to exchange information, cooperate in investigation economic sectors 
of global importance, eventually initiating joint competition law enforcement action; (iii) 
represent the interests and vision of the BRICS jurisdictions with regard to the global 
architecture of competition law enforcement, but also enabling the construction of 
alternative narratives to the current mainstream NPT-based model, that we think may 
not, in many cases, fit well the particular challenges to which BRICS jurisdictions, but 
also emergent and developing countries, are subject to. 
 
A. The Google cases as a moment in the emergence of a truly global 
antitrust: BRICS as a protagonist? 
 
Alphabet’s Google’s contractual (and other) practices with regard to its search 
engine and Android, an off-the-shelf Operating system (OS) that Original Equipment 
Manufacturers can freely install on a cell phone or other computing devices, have been 
at the centre of the enforcement attention of various competition authorities around 
the world, including BRICS authorities.  
In 2012, the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (Mofcom) 
announced its conditional approval of the $12,5 billion buy-out of Motorola by 
Google99 , a merger also approved by the European Commission 100  and the US 
antitrust authorities101. It is of interest however that MOFCOM’s decision addressed a 
number of issues relating to the interaction between Google and the Original 
Equipment Manufacturers of smartphones regarding the licensing of the Android 
system. The Chinese merger regulator insisted that Android should be licensed on 
free-of-charge terms and being kept as open-source software, that all OEMs should 
be treated in fair and non-discriminatory manner (although this obligation only applied 
to the original equipment manufacturers who have agreed not to differentiate or derive 
from the Android platform and did not apply to Google providing, licensing or 
distributing of any products or services relating to the Android platform), and that 
Google should continue to fulfil the FRAND commitment it had taken in licensing the 
patents obtained from Motorola Mobility. 
It is clear that some of these conditions did not reflect the core business reason 
of the merger transaction. The aim of the transaction was for Google to acquire 
Motorola’s valuable patent portfolio for its ongoing competitive struggles (defensive 
                                                          
99  See 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/domesticpolicy/201206/20120608199125.shtml . 
100  Case No COMP/M.6381 GOOGLE/ MOTOROLA MOBILITY (February 13, 2012), available at 
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. 
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patenting) against Apple, a vertically integrated company in the smartphones market, 
and against Microsoft that had just acquired Nokia, an original equipment 
manufacturer and had for this reason access to Nokia’s patents. Google’s business 
model does not also rely on royalty payments, as its main revenues come from 
advertising from its search engine and its strategy is to promote the use of Android by 
as many OEMs as possible102. However, the concerns expressed by the Chinese 
merger regulator with regard to the openness of the Android platform and the FRAND 
commitment may be understood by its will to protect the position of 
smartphone/hardware manufacturers (some of the most important ones globally being 
based in China) from a possible exercise by Google of its bargaining power, with 
respect either to exploitation of its FRAND commitment or to charging excessive 
licensing rates in case they decide to change their business model103. 
Google also faced competition law investigations by the Competition 
Commission of India. One investigation focused on Google’s termination of two 
companies’ AdWords accounts. Audney and Albion were two “remote tech support” 
(RTS) companies that advertised on Google’s search results page through Google 
AdWords. RTS firms offer tech support from a remote location (often by ghosting into 
the customer’s computer to fix problems). Audney and Albion offered these services 
outside India.  Google terminated both companies’ AdWords accounts because it 
allegedly found they were violating Google’s user safety policies. Audney and Albion 
counter-attacked alleging an abuse of dominance. The CCI issued prima facie findings 
against Google, asking the DG to investigate. The DG Report is yet to be issued.  
The other investigation is much broader. Based on two complaints (by a 
consumer organization and a matrimonial services website), the CCI issued prima 
facie findings against Google and referred the matter to the DG. The DG investigated 
for more than 3 years and issued its Report in August 2015.  The Report was leaked 
to the press and there has been wide publicly available coverage of the DG’s claims 
and the case in general. The Report alleges various infringements, regarding (i) 
Google Search, because of the prominent display of Google’s in-built services (e.g., 
news, images, maps, etc.) on the search results page; (ii) advertising (AdWords), as 
Google does not provide advertisers sufficient information, allows bidding on 
competitors’ trademarks, provides preferential treatment of Google ads, includes 
restrictions in the AdWords API on moving data between different advertising 
platforms; (iii) Google has entered into exclusivity agreements with browsers for 
                                                          
102 This is a very different business model from that of Apple, BlackBerry, and Microsoft, which are all 
integrated hardware-software businesses. Indeed, Google sold Motorola’s mobile phone operations to 
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search services, and with websites for search and ad services; and (v) Google is 
“scraping” “snippets” and images from websites on the search results page104. 
Google has also faced antitrust action in Brazil. Buscapé, a price comparison 
website brought a private action against Google alleging that Google (1) manipulates 
its search service, controlling 95 percent of the market, by allowing only Google 
Shopping to display images of the searched merchandise, which is not permitted to 
Buscapé  and other competitors, (2) embezzles and usurps the database of reviews 
— clients’ evaluations of the purchases gathered along more than 10 years by 
Buscapé and other competing price comparison websites, and (3) artificially includes 
Google Shopping in the first ranks of the organic search results, whenever a consumer 
conducts a query for the purchase of products in Google Search, thus harming the 
other competing websites.  
 Google was granted summary judgment against the company. The court found 
that “there are several search services at the disposal of the consumers who are 
looking for products, and at the disposal of the merchants intending to attract 
consumers [i.e., Bing, Yahoo, Ask]. Google’s leadership in the internet search 
segment in Brazil cannot be mistaken with a monopoly of that activity”. The Brazilian 
court concluded that Buscapé “does not need and is not dependent on Google Search 
to [be found by consumers]” as the users may access its website, and those of other 
competing price comparison websites, without passing through Google. The Court 
also held that Google Shopping is not a shopping comparison site like Buscapé “but 
just a thematic search option within the generic search made available by Google 
Search”, thus refusing to consider vertical search as a separate product. The court 
also noted that “nothing prevents [Google], in the conduction of its profit corporate 
business, from developing and using a tool (algorithmic formula) that returns results 
to a user query in Google search in a display order dictated by Google’s quality and 
relevance criteria”105.  
Although this summary judgment ended the private action against Google, 
Brazil’s competition prosecutor CADE opened in October 2013 a series of 
investigations into Google after receiving complaints from Microsoft and other 
companies. Although as a result of a global agreement with Google, in April 2016 
Microsoft agreed to stop pursuing antitrust complaints against Google Inc. in Europe 
and other parts of the world106, CADE continues its probe against Google107, exploring 
                                                          
104  Presentation by Karan Singh Chandhiok, April 22, 2016, HSE Skolkovo Institute for Law and 
Development conference on “The hidden side of the moon: Google’s BRICS competition law cases and 
the role of BRICS in the emergence of global competition law norms regarding unilateral conduct”. 
105  See, http://searchengineland.com/google-wins-major-antitrust-victory-in-brazil-does-it-foreshadow-
broader-eu-us-wins-132729 . 
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whether Google unfairly scrapes the content from rival websites, discourages their 
advertisers and favours its own product listings in search results108. 
In 2015, the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service adopted a decision finding 
Google “guilty of abusing its dominant position” and requesting Google to make 
changes in the requirements it puts on its hardware partners109. This decision has 
been recently confirmed on appeal110. The FAS found that Google was dominant in 
view of the ubiquity of Google Play in Android-operating system mobile phones. 
Google did not enjoy a dominant position in general Search in view of the strong 
position of the local incumbent Yandex in PC search. Yet, its power in the rapidly 
expanding and strategic mobile search market was quite pre-eminent, the main 
concern in the FAS decision being the leveraging of Google’s dominant position in 
mobile search to PC search, and the marginalization of the local incumbent. 
The Russian FAS found that Google had abused this dominant position by 
imposing the mandatory acquisition of the entire Google Mobile Services (GMS) suite 
(which includes Google Search, and Chrome) as a condition for obtaining 
Google Play, thus bundling apps from GMS with the Google Play store. Furthermore, 
by requiring the mandatory setting/pre-installation of Google Search as a default 
search engine in all search entry points in respect of the general web search. and 
thirdly, by requiring the advantageous placement of Google app icons on the first 
screen of a Mobile device, thus offering them preferential treatment and by prohibiting 
the pre-installation of competing to GMS applications and services (such as third-party 
“store” and third party “search”) on any other of its devices running other versions of 
Android (Android forks). This prohibition was also secured by a remuneration payable 
by Google.  
The decision of the FAS is based on some empirical evidence indicating that 
the majority of users of Mobile Devices consider availability of an app store a 
mandatory condition for the purchase of such device. Furthermore, the decision was 
based on the finding that there are no devices in the Russian market without pre-
installed Google Play, except for a number of devices the market share of which is 
negligible. Thus, availability of Google Play was actually considered a necessary 
requirement for the production and sale of a competitive Mobile Device. The FAS 
concluded that Google’s practice of bundling the Google Play app store, in relation to 
which Google enjoys a dominant market position, with the other GMS applications 
which usually face competition, without any technological reasons for it, restricts 
access of undertakings competing with Google to several markets where the GMS 
applications and services are circulating, and subsequently may result in squeezing 
such undertakings out from such markets. The FAS also considered that pre-
installation was the most effective promotion channel for mobile applications and 
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provides for the widest coverage and frequency of use of applications on Mobile 
Devices, in view of the passive behaviour of users (as it was found that end users 
usually do not change pre-installed applications and services and do not download 
similar applications independently). The FAS adopted a cease and desist order and 
imposed a fine calculated on the basis of Google’s turnover in the Russian Federation. 
 
Table: Google investigations by BRICS Competition Authorities 
 
Countries Vertical 
search 
OS 
Devices 
Mobile search AdWords/AdSense 
Brazil X (price 
comparison) 
  
 
China 
 
X 
 
 
India X 
  
X 
Russia 
  
X  
 
What is quite interesting with these Google investigations is that the BRICS 
competition authorities have acted as trend setters, rather than as followers 
piggybacking on the enforcement activity of the US and/or EU competition authorities. 
Indeed, while the US FTC did not touch upon Android in its 2013 settlement with 
Google111, in April 2016 it has expressed concerns that Google unfairly used Android’s 
strength in the mobile computing market to prioritize its own services over those of 
competitors112.  
In April 2016, the European Commission announced that it sent a statement of 
objections to Google, in which it takes the preliminary view that the company has, in 
breach of EU antitrust rules, “abused its dominant position” by imposing restrictions 
on Android device manufacturers and mobile network operators. In contrast with the 
situation of the Russian market, Google disposes of a significant market share in PC 
search. The Commission’s statement of objections indicates that Google is dominant 
in view of the quasi-monopoly position of Google Play in Android OS, Google Search 
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dominance in Android OS and the fact that GMS is dominant in Android OS. With this 
difference aside, the Commission finds problematic the contractual tying of the Google 
Play with other apps in GMS, as well as the anti-fragmentation clause which 
essentially means that an OEM cannot produce some devices with GMS on the 
“standardized Google version of Android” and some without it on another version of 
Android, thus limiting competition from Android forks (a maintenance of monopoly, 
rather than a pre leveraging narrative as in the Russian case).  
Although the South Korea’s Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”) dropped a two-
year investigation into Android in 2013 confirming that Google’s Android business 
model did not infringe competition law, it has recently been reported that it re-opened 
its investigation on the matter113. In July 2016, the European Commission also filed a 
third antitrust charge against Google with regard to its AdSense advertising business, 
which with AdWords forms the bulk of Google’s $75 billion revenue in 2015.  
One couldn’t help but notice that many of the cases brought by the EU, US and 
South Korean competition authorities are on similar grounds than the ones 
investigated by the BRICS authorities, which in this case took the initiative and played 
an active role in re-framing the anti-competitive effects narrative. The future will show 
if the positions adopted in BRICS jurisdictions will be compatible with those of the EU, 
US and South Korean competition watchdogs. 
 
B. Promoting pluralism in Global Antitrust Discourses: the need for 
a BRICS Joint Research Platform 
 
The area of competition law has increasingly been a theme for BRICS cooperation, 
in particular since the joint declaration of the heads of BRICS governments in Ufa in 
2015. In 2014, the HSE-Skolkovo Institute for Law and Development in collaboration 
with FAS Russia and with the support of the Centre for Law, Economics and Society 
(CLES) at UCL Faculty of Laws, established an annual forum in St. Petersburg with 
the aim to promote an academic-competition authority knowledge platform between 
BRICS authorities and a number of BRICS and foreign academics in competition law 
and policy. The two first competition law fora held in June 2015 and May 2016 were 
supported by the Centre for Law, Economics and Society at UCL Faculty of Laws. In 
May 2016, the BRICS competition authorities signed a memorandum of cooperation 
which puts in place an Institutional Partnership between BRICS jurisdictions through 
a general framework for multilateral cooperation.  
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed the 19th of May 2016 and 
remaining in effect for a period of four years, aims at promoting and strengthening the 
cooperation in competition law and policy of the Parties through exchanges of 
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information and best practices, as well as through capacity-building activities. This 
would, for instance, take the form of exchanging policies, laws, rules and information 
on legislative changes and enforcement activities, the organization of joint studies for 
the purpose of providing common knowledge on competition issues, the organization 
of international conferences, seminars and other relevant events on competition 
issues, including the BRICS International Competition Conference held once every 
two years, the cooperation and coordination between BRICS jurisdictions of 
investigations and enforcement proceedings regarding competition law enforcement. 
A Liaison Committee, consisting of one representative of each BRICS jurisdiction, will 
ensure adequate communications and consultations among the Parties. A quite 
interesting provision in the MoU is the establishment of working groups to conduct joint 
studies on matters of common interest, such working groups being proposed by a 
Party through the Liaison Committee. Each party is free to make its own decision 
whether or not to participate in a working group, in view of its needs, available 
resources and other considerations. A provision guarantees the confidentiality of 
information exchanges between the BRICS competition authorities, although 
competition authorities are not required to communicate such information, if this is 
prohibited by their domestic law, or if such communications would be incompatible 
with the interests of that Party. The MoU also includes a clause on the settlement of 
disputes arising out of the interpretation, application or implementation of the MoU, 
which should be settled amicably through consultation or negotiation between the 
Parties. 
These new developments indicate that BRICS jurisdictions are increasingly taking 
a more pro-active approach in collaborating in the area of global antitrust, for matters 
that concern their own jurisdiction and may affect their economy. Within the context of  
a group of BRICS academic institutions, we have been thinking on the elaboration of 
a proper competition authorities-academia partnership, which may cover more areas 
than the global food value chain, which has been the first project initiated having from 
its inception a BRICS dimension. For instance, a lot of work may be undertaken with 
regard to the regulation of competition in digital markets, the pharmaceutical industry, 
the interaction between competition law and intellectual property, the competition 
policy implications of big data. We envision the establishment of inter-disciplinary 
cross-BRICS teams which may provide high value independent academic comment 
geared towards the situation of the BRICS economies, and societies. These teams will 
be open to academics from other jurisdictions, from different fields (law, economics, 
finance), with the aim to enhance the global visibility of the research produced and to 
attain the highest quality in terms of research methodologies and content. Such public-
academic partnership may provide the first step in a more systematic long-term 
research cooperation between BRICS in the area of competition law and policy.  
I suggest that the work of these inter-disciplinary teams, operating as autonomous 
academic networks, may be structured within a BRICS Joint Research Platform in 
41 
 
Competition Law and Policy that will carry out research in order to provide independent 
scientific advice and support to policy adopted by BRICS jurisdictions from world 
leading researchers, and will also channel the research work accomplished by the 
various inter-disciplinary groups to the BRICS competition authorities, and the global 
community of scholars in competition law. This independent, evidence-based scientific 
and technical support could be provided throughout the whole policy cycle, while 
flexibly responding to new policy demands. It could also constitute one of the few, 
BRICS-created, institutions within the BRICS international system, in addition to the 
Contingency Reserve Arrangement and the New Development Bank. The BRICS Joint 
Research Platform will contribute to the overall objectives of the BRICS competition 
law authorities with its long-standing scientific expertise, modelling capacity, foresight 
studies, knowledge management, training activities, work on best practices, 
infrastructure and e-infrastructures. With a number of BRICS partners we envision to 
develop a web-based interactive platform for the different research projects 
undertaken in the context of the Joint Research platform. Common BRICS research 
seminars and training sessions open to the staff of BRICS competition authorities and 
other officials with BRICS-based and international experts may also be organized.  
Eventually, the benefits of the development of this BRICS competition law and 
policy forum may be quite important for the BRICS competition authorities and more 
generally the BRICS countries’ societies. The Joint Research Platform will constitute 
a source of independent and ground-breaking empirically driven research providing 
the necessary analysis and market intelligence so as to enable BRICS competition 
authorities to develop a bird’s eye long term view on important competition law 
questions and issues that may arise in the future, which is essential for the 
development of evidence-based policy. It may economize on the resources of the 
BRICS competition authorities by enabling them to receive academic advice from a 
pool of leading BRICS researchers and selected international experts. Such research 
capabilities may not currently exist for all areas of competition law enforcement. The 
BRICS Joint Research Platform in competition law and policy may also provide an 
invaluable resource for independent academic comment. In case research capabilities 
already exist, the existence of the BRICS competition law and policy forum will free 
some in-house research teams of the BRICS competition authorities from these tasks, 
thus enabling them to focus on immediate priorities and pending case work.  
The ambition of the BRICS Joint Research Platform is to produce knowledge on 
competition law enforcement that would be useful for both the academic community 
and the world of practice. It should seek to actively involve these communities in our 
various research projects and to promote the interaction and the dialogue between 
them through the organization of conferences and other events, as well as the 
promotion of specific research projects and the organization of joint training and 
knowledge sharing activities by BRICS and international experts for the benefit of 
competition law officials, representatives of business, consumer associations and 
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other stakeholders. Indeed, the interaction of competition authorities with academia is 
a prevalent practice among many competition law authorities around the world and 
international organizations involved in competition policy. For instance, UNCTAD has 
put in place a few years now a Research Partnership Platform with a number of 
academic institutions around the world participating in it. The ICN relies on non-
governmental advisors coming from academia in the work undertaken in its various 
working groups. However, these efforts to involve academia are not systematic and 
do not proceed with a clear strategic perspective, as the one we are suggesting the 
BRICS authorities to adopt with the establishment of the BRICS Joint Research 
Platform in Competition Law and Policy. We consider that the specific situation of the 
BRICS supports a more pro-active approach than that followed by the other 
international players in global competition law and policy, so as to weighing in the 
discussion over the governance of global competition law. We consider that for this 
reason, the BRICS Joint Research Platform should be perceived as a truly global 
institution, involving BRICS and non-BRICS experts who would be working on a 
specific research agenda promoted by the BRICS authorities. More than just gaining 
valuable expertise, the Joint Research Platform will aim to provide an academic voice 
for the concerns expressed by the BRICS societies. 
The current debate in global competition law and policy is inevitably influenced by 
the agenda of the two main jurisdictions in terms of competition law enforcement 
experience, academic research capabilities, economic development and market size, 
the European Union and the United States. It is true that in recent years the 
competition law regimes of the BRICS jurisdictions attracted a lot of attention from 
academia and other stakeholders. However, this effort is still nascent and as sketched 
above has not yet been systematic. The aim of the Joint BRICS Competition Law and 
Policy Platform will be to provide the first systematic effort to establish a genuine 
BRICS-oriented agenda and provide information on the BRICS countries’ models in 
competition law and policy. It might also provide an opportunity for our research 
community to explore the possibility of the emergence of a BRICS competition law and 
policy model, in view of the importance the various BRICS countries put on the 
objectives of development and growth. Starting from concrete economic sectors and 
developing an academic dialogue among many various academic teams from BRICS, 
the BRICS Joint Research Platform for Competition Law and Policy will enable BRICS 
to develop incrementally a more general approach and strategy with regard to global 
competition law and policy issues. It goes also without saying that such initiative will 
enhance the quality of research in competition policy and law performed in BRICS and 
will generate fruitful academic cooperation between researchers coming from different 
disciplines and BRICS countries. 
In parallel to the BRICS Joint Research Platform in Competition Law and Policy, 
we consider that collaborative initiatives focusing on the exchange of information may 
develop between the various BRICS competition authorities. We consider that 
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initiatives such as the BRICS Joint Research Platform may enhance trust among 
BRICS competition law authorities so that they can envision the development of a 
closer cooperation in the future, in particular by promoting common positions on the 
emerging global governance of competition law and policy or conduct transnational 
sector enquiries. But more than just represent the voice and interests of BRICS 
jurisdictions, the BRICS Joint Research Platform should be perceived as a tool to 
promote alternative models for competition law, inspired by the experience of the 
BRICS jurisdictions and other emerging economies or developing countries, thus 
promoting the ambition of a global deliberative space in competition law. Put simply, 
the BRICS Joint Research Platform could serve as a gateway for under-represented 
interests to contribute to the discussion on the future architecture of the global 
governance of antitrust. It may also provide the opportunity to engage in a critical 
discussion over the concepts, methodologies and tools of competition law, away from 
the “policy convergence” fetishism that has so far impeded new jurisdictions adopting 
competition law from exploring the potential offered by their own legal culture, but also 
the variety of sources of wisdom, and not just NPT, that may eventually contribute to 
framing a competition law and policy that benefits from a high degree of legitimacy as 
it reflects the concerns of their societies. Global governance in the antitrust field can 
only but gain from legal pluralism and additional spaces of experimentation.  
 
C. A Roadmap for the BRICS Joint Research Platform: the missing 
discussions 
 
As it was explained in the previous part, the dual aim followed by the BRICS Joint 
Research Platform in Competition Law and Policy will be (i) to enhance trust between 
different BRICS competition authorities by promoting their cooperation and assisting 
them in developing a common knowledge base, methodologies and tools that fit their 
specific needs and aspirations, and (ii) to offer a global voice for the BRICS in the 
current discussion over the global governance of competition law and policy. In order 
to gain the support of the global community, in particular the great majority of emergent 
and developing economies that form the bulk of jurisdictions implementing competition 
law, the voice of the BRICS in the antitrust field has to be distinctive and true to the 
concerns of the citizens of these countries.  
The quest of “policy convergence” has often led to the exclusion of a number 
of issues/topics which the BRICS and other emerging economies may consider 
important. These have been often relegated to other fields of law (where no such effort 
of policy convergence has taken place), or, in the worst case scenario, they have been 
ignored altogether. In the world of “policy convergence”, legal pluralism remains 
suspect and should eventually be banned. I take a different perspective and consider 
that for competition law regimes to become effective and endure through time, it is 
crucial that they should enjoy a high degree of legitimacy, including acceptance by 
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their citizenry. This process of internal (rather than external through peer-acceptance 
by other competition authorities and international organisations) legitimacy-building 
may set limits to procedural or substantive policy convergence. The work undertaken 
in the context of the proposed BRICS Joint Research Platform will of course be a 
matter for open discussion between the BRICS competition authorities and their 
stakeholders, but I suggest tentatively the following roadmap as the starting point for 
such discussion.  
 
1. Broadening the vision of competition law: Global Value 
Chains and transnational production 
 
The dominance of NPT theory in modern antitrust has led to the exclusion of 
other sources of wisdom such as political economy or economic sociology from the 
work of competition authorities. The rigor of NPT and its relatively narrow perspective, 
which is based on methodological individualism, is considered as a better basis in 
order to ensure policy convergence, assisted by the use of a common vocabulary and 
calibrated research methods. Social action and the ensuing order are perceived as 
generated by objective economic interests of the individual actor, the latter behaving 
in an instrumental (rational) way in order to maximize some welfare function. This is 
also how the activity of social organisations is perceived, as a result of coordinated 
individual action. What is absent from such analysis is the role that social relations and 
social institutions play in the economy, the latter being considered as distinct 
configurations of interests and social relations. Work in political economy and 
economic sociology may provide the bigger picture we need in order to understand 
the full dimension of competitive interactions. To give an example, we consider that 
competition authorities should engage with the concept of global value chains and the 
important work in this are. 
The last two decades we have witnessed the emergence of a “new economy” 
driven by the important technological changes and the emergence of a new kind of 
infrastructure technology, the Internet. As sociologist Manuel Castells noted, this 
economy is global in nature, not just international: 
“A global economy is a historically new reality, distinct from a world economy. 
A world economy, that is an economy in which capital accumulation proceeds 
throughout the world, has existed in the West at least since the sixteenth 
century […] A global economy is something different: it is an economy with the 
capacity to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale”114. 
 As it is noted by Kevin Sobel-Read, 
                                                          
114 CASTELLS, Manuel, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture – The Rise of the Network 
Society (Wiley, 1996) , p. 92 
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“The paradigm of the world political economy has shifted dramatically over the 
past twenty years. Legal scholarship, however, lags significantly behind. 
Existing legal scholarship is calibrated to an outdated model that suggests that 
multinational corporations — either individually or through one-to-one supplier 
relationships — create, manufacture, and sell a given product. But in today’s 
world, in what have been termed “global value chains,” the research, design, 
production, and retail of most products take place through coordinated chain 
components that stretch systemically across multiple — from a few to a few 
thousand — firms”115. 
These global value chains (GVCs) are characterised by their “systemic, 
coordination-driven nature”, as they rely on various systems of transnational 
governance and different sorts of linkages, some traditional such as contract law, 
others novel and relying on corporate law, property law or some more informal 
mechanisms116. For instance, “global value chains are becoming a primary conduit for 
the transfer of intellectual property globally”, as “(t)he creators of intellectual products 
are relying less on traditional intellectual property regimes to enable them to limit 
access to their material, and more on a combination of contractual rights and 
technological protections”117.  
GVCs are prevalent in the global economy. As a recent joint OECD, WTO and 
World bank report indicates, “(b)etween 30% and 60% of G20 countries’ exports 
consist of intermediate inputs traded within GVCs”118. Kevin Sobel-Read goes as far 
as arguing that “(t)he most important paradigm for understanding the global economy, 
and the political and social relationships that both guide it and stem from it, is no longer 
the template of the market but rather the role of global value chains”, corporate action, 
in the form of global value chains not only driving but also defining, and therefore 
creating, the market119. Indeed, economic production is increasingly structured around 
GVCs, which permit the simultaneous and coordinated transnational production and 
distribution of a very large array of products that each stage of the supply chain has to 
manage effectively, without this involving vertical integration by ownership.120 
The development of technology has made supply chain management more 
effective and less expensive, enabling companies to achieve higher quality at a lower 
production cost. One may also trace the development of value chains in the expansion 
                                                          
115 SOBEL-READ, Kevin B. (2014), Global value Chains: A Framework for Analysis, Transnational 
Legal Theory, 5(3), pp. 364-407, 364. 
116 Id., at 365. 
117 Id., at 392. 
118  OECD, WTO and World Bank group, Global Value Chains; Challenges, Opportunities and 
Implications for Policy (2014), available at https://www.oecd.org/tad/gvc_report_g20_july_2014.pdf , p. 
13. See also UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf . 
119 SOBEL-READ, Kevin B. (2014), Global value Chains: A Framework for Analysis, Transnational 
Legal Theory, 5(3), pp. 364-407, 367. 
120 DE BACKER, Koen & S. MIROUDOT, Sébastien (2014), Mapping Global Value Chains, European 
Central Bank, Working Paper Series, No. 1677.  
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of national and international regulations regarding consumer protection, food safety 
and quality, and technical standardisation. These supply chains start from the factors 
of production and other inputs needed for the production of a good and end up with 
distribution of the end product to the final consumer. Firms find it crucial to enter into 
long-term agreements with partners in other segments of a value chain, in order to 
create the necessary relation of trust that is required by the importance of relation-
specific investments that need to be undertaken in setting the supply chain 
management. This may lead to disintermediation and vertical integration but also to 
de-concentration through the constitution of networks or supply alliances that are 
managed by supply chain councils. These various forms of supply chain management 
share the common characteristic that they are all ultimately consumer orientated, as 
any segment of the chain directs its efforts towards meeting the needs of the next 
member of the chain, the perception being that all segments of the chain do not 
constitute separate islands of activity but essential ingredients for the formation of the 
total value of the chain. For instance, brand-building takes the wider perspective, that 
of the whole value chain, leading to the elaboration of labels and standards to which 
the various segments of the chain abide.  
With some exceptions GVCs have not been explored systematically by 
competition law scholars121. The concept offers an important analytical potential. The 
most obvious one relates to the transnational dimension it brings forward, calling for a 
“transnational coordination” between “destination states” and “producer states”, this 
coordination being pursued at global, regional or bilateral levels122. A deeper impact 
could be the re-conceptualization of the way competition law deals with vertical 
integration or quasi-integration. Traditionally, the relation between the different levels 
of a vertical supply chain has been thought as complementary, competition authorities 
rarely seeing any reason to intervene, unless one of the segments disposes of 
considerable market power and engages in acts of exclusion by, for instance, raising 
the costs of its rivals upstream or downstream. This approach tends to ignore the 
allocation of the revenues engendered by the supply chain between the various 
partners (what some have called “vertical competition”)123, as an issue external to the 
                                                          
121 See, LIANOS, Ioannis & LOMBARDI, Claudio (2016), Superior Bargaining Power and the Global 
Food Value Chain: The Wuthering  
Heights of Holistic Competition Law? Concurrences I-2016, pp. 22-35; GERBER, David (2016), 
Competition Law and Global Supply Chains (June 16, 2016). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2807154; LIANOS, Ioannis, Global Value Chains and Competition Law (forth. 
2016), CLES Research paper series 7/2016; DAVIS, Dennis, KALPINSKY, Raphael & MORRIS, Mike, 
Rents, Power and Governance in Global Value Chains, Chapter in I. Lianos, A. Ivanov & D. Davis (eds.), 
Global Food Value Chains and Competition Law (forth. 2017). 
122 GERBER, David (2016), Competition Law and Global Supply Chains (June 16, 2016). Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2807154 , pp. 24-26. 
123 STEINER, Robert L (1991), Intrabrand Competition-Stepchild of Antitrust, The Antitrust Bulletin, 36, 
pp. 155-200. See also SOBEL-READ, Kevin B. (2014), Global value Chains: A Framework for Analysis, 
Transnational Legal Theory, 5(3), pp. 364-407, 384, noting that “(o)ne consequence of these evolving 
strategies is that competition in the global marketplace is becoming increasingly vertical rather than 
horizontal. In other words, the most effective path for a clothing supplier in Reebok’s value chain is often 
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exclusive focus of competition law on economic efficiency. In contrast, the GVC 
approach recognizes that issues relating to the distribution of the total surplus value 
of the chain also take a prominent role in the relation between the various economic 
actors participating to the supply chain, in particular as supply chain management, 
even if it is flexible, crystallizes more easily their position (and share). By dissecting 
the chain-wide coordination of various economic activities, the GVC approach also 
better describes the systemic nature of GVCs, each part of the chain impacting on the 
others. 
 The GVC approach provides a theoretical framework enabling us to understand 
how the global division and integration of labour in the world economy has evolved 
over time and, more importantly, how the distribution of awards, from the total surplus 
value, is allocated between the various segments of the chain.124 The starting point for 
the development of this framework was the growing importance of new global 
corporations, such as buyers (e.g. big retail) constituting “buyer-driven global 
commodity chains”. These powerful lead firms are usually located in the industrialized 
countries and interact with economically less powerful suppliers present in the 
developing countries. Contrary to traditional NPT analysis, and more in vogue with 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and economics of organization, the GVC approach 
enables competition authorities to focus not only on issues of horizontal market power 
and concentration at each segment of the chain, but also to engage with the vertical 
links between the various actors with the aim to understand how and whether “lead” 
actors can capture value. Their focus is on the distribution of the value generated by 
the chain, rather than only on the maximization of the surplus (efficiency) as such. 
 GVC’s “holistic view” of global industries centres on the governance of the value 
chain, that is, how some actors can shape the distribution of profits and risks in the 
chain. Taking a political economy perspective, the GVC approach explores the way 
economic actors may maintain or improve (“upgrade”) their position in the global value 
chain, “economic upgrading” being defined as “the process by which economic actors 
— firms and workers —  move from low-value to relatively high-value activities in 
GVC.”125. Concerns over global competitiveness, employment, investment in quality 
competition and long-term consumer interest may weigh in the decision of competition 
                                                          
not to switch to a slightly better contract with a competing brand such as Adidas but instead to advance 
to higher value- added work within its existing value chain for Reebok. Such work can include the 
performance of additional activities (e.g. assembly in addition to cutting) or the performance of current 
activities for a more profitable market (e.g. cutting high-performance cotton rather than standard 
cotton)”. 
124 On the GVC framework and its predecessor Global Commodity Chains, see GEREFFI, Gary & M. 
KORZIENEWICZ, Miguel (eds.), Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism (Westport: Praeger, 1994);. 
KAPLISNKY, Raphael & MORRIS, Mike, A Handbook for Value Chain Research, available at 
https://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/pdfs/VchNov01.pdf . 
125 GEREFFI, Gary (2014), Global value chains in a post-Washington Consensus world, (Review of 
International Political Economy 21(1), pp. 9-37, 18. 
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authorities to explore the dynamics of global value chains and the way issues of 
distribution may be included in competition law assessment. 
 A typology of GVC governance structures was elaborated with the aim to describe 
and explain the driving forces for the constitution of global value chains. According to 
Gereffi et al., there are “three key determinants of value chain governance patterns: 
complexity of transactions, codifiability of information; and capability of suppliers.”126 
His framework is broader than the framework often employed by TCE in order to 
explain the prevalence of certain forms of organization (hierarchy versus the market 
system), as the latter focuses only on the determinants of asset specificity and the 
frequency of the transactions as the driving forces for organizational choice.127  
 The GVC framework draws inspiration from the resource-based or competences-
based view of the firm, according to which firms are path-dependent entities 
characterised by heterogeneous competence bases and operating under conditions 
of genuine uncertainty, their existence being justified by the development of productive 
competencies and learning for a specific cognitive community that forms the firm’s 
core128. Contrary to what TCE predicts, firms will not necessarily develop specific 
capabilities and learning in order to engage in certain value activities, because for 
instance of economies of scale and the frequency of transactions, as they may be 
unable to develop the capabilities which are necessary for them to participate in certain 
value chain activities; they will be thus obliged to appeal to external resources.129 
Contrary to the contract theory of the firm, pioneered by TCE, the competence-base 
view of the firm enquires into the sources of the competitive advantage and the path-
dependent process of accumulation of such capabilities.  
 The various forms of organization of global value chains highlight the importance of 
conducting a careful analysis of the power relations along the supply chain, the aim 
being to unveil value extraction bottlenecks affecting the distribution of the total surplus 
value and affecting, inter alia, the incentives of the various actors in the chain to 
innovate. This analysis cannot be undertaken by the traditional NPT framework which 
mainly focuses on horizontal competition and its effects on consumers or total welfare 
and assesses the competitive interactions between firms within a specific relevant 
market. In contrast, the GVC perspective has a distributive focus and may be 
particularly helpful if one aims to understand real business strategies and how the 
design of the value chain may determine who profits from the collective innovation and 
                                                          
126 GEREFFI, Gary, HUMPHREY, John & STURGEON, Timothy (2005), The governance of global 
value chains, (2005) Review of International Political Economy, 12(1), pp. 78-104, 84. 
127 In a nutshell, the more there is asset specificity and the interaction is long-term, the more it is 
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128 GEREFFI, Gary, HUMPHREY, John & STURGEON, Timothy (2005), The governance of global 
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of the Growth of the Firm (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1959). See, more generally, HODGSON, 
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other surplus value generated, the inter-country distribution of the total surplus value, 
in the case of transnational networks, if one takes a political economy perspective, 
and more broadly the impact of value extraction bottlenecks on the competitive 
process, the latter concept being intrinsically related to an evolutionary perspective on 
economic change. 
 We consider that such an approach is particularly helpful for understanding the 
challenges transnational production raises to competition law enforcement. This is 
particularly the case in the context of global value chains affecting developing or 
emergent economies130, which is a topic that has attracted some attention, in view of 
the necessity to promote a political economy framework that will enable local firms to 
participate in global value chains and thus to capture value, or to “upgrade” existing 
capabilities and to create “domestic” added value. 
 
2. Responding to New Challenges: A Competition Law for the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution 
 
We live during a period of important technological changes, whose impact on 
economic production, employment, but also society at large is not fully comprehended. 
As many areas of law, competition law disposes of a conceptual toolkit that needs 
constant updating in order to be implemented in increasingly complex areas of 
economic activity. In view of the rapid pace of technological advances, law is usually 
lagging behind, which increases the risk that it may be ineffectual in fulfilling its aims. 
As many other public authorities, competition law enforcers may be ill-prepared to deal 
with the challenges of the so called “fourth industrial revolution”131. In a period of 
convergence of physical, biological and digital worlds, as a result of the recent 
transformations of industrial production, and the dislocation of boundaries between 
markets, one may find that, for instance, the traditional relevant market concept based 
on the principle of cross-price elasticity between products, from the point of view of the 
consumer, may fail to describe the complex competitive interactions of firms 
constituting a “strategic group”132, disposing of similar resources, and serving the 
                                                          
130 See, for instance, KAPLINSKY, Raphael, Competitions Policy and the Global Coffee and Cocoa 
Value Chains, Paper prepared for the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (Institute 
of Development Studies, Sussex, Brighton, 2004), available at 
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131 SCHWAB, Klaus, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (World Economic Forum, 2016). 
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50 
 
same customers’ needs133, thus constraining the action of each other, even if their 
products do not overlap in the same relevant market. Some may go as far as defining 
markets as “tangible cliques of producers watching each other […] (p)ressure from the 
buyer side creates a mirror in which the producers see themselves, not consumers”134. 
How could one proceed to market delineation in a world in which personalisation of 
production means that consumers become the designers of the individually 
customised products they will consume, the products being produced by 3-D printing 
and robots, firms competing mainly on the market for personal information, which will 
serve as the raw material on which personalised production will take place? Which of 
the various approaches is chosen very much depends on the type of 
competition/tournament taking place in the specific “field”135. Competition can be for 
the market, as well as take place in the market136. Platform or system competition 
characterises a lot of competitive interactions in the network economy.  
Looking to the IT sector, in particular, it is undeniable that the development of 
the World Wide Web has profoundly transformed the global economy, accentuating 
transnational commercial activity, first with the dazzling growth of e- and m-commerce, 
and the rapid development of global digital platforms, which now constitute the largest 
in terms of capitalization corporations in the world. The expansion of the more rapid 
broadband connections, until then merely used by business, to consumers, which 
were until then connected to the Internet using much slower dial-up modems, has 
contributed to this development. The increased use of the Internet, the more intensive 
use of e-mail technologies, the growth of online advertising activity and subsequently 
the development of Web 2.0 technologies, allowing users to participate in the creation, 
editing and distribution of content online, were among the factors explaining the 
phenomenal increase of the economic significance of electronic commerce and digital 
platforms globally. The widespread use of smartphones or the development of tablet 
computers have led to the transition from browsers to apps, thus further increasing the 
opportunities for growth of e-commerce and of the various digital platforms that 
emerged. Worldwide mobile broadband subscriptions have even quadrupled in the 
past five years, to over 3.5 billion in 2015. Social networking technologies enable 
social platforms, such as Facebook, or microblogging platforms, such as Twitter, to 
emerge as additional e-and m-commerce sites and platforms, taking advantage of 
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interpersonal connections to provide targeted advertising or promotion of products 
(social commerce).  
Big Data analytics and the massive collection of personal data may further help 
in tracking with detail the behaviour of consumers (their digital identity), when 
navigating the Internet, and help companies predict the kinds of products and services 
consumers may be interested in. These tracking technologies, such as barcodes, 
bokodes, smart cards and Radio Frequency Identification devices are embedded in 
the various objects, collecting data about them without any human intervention and 
feeding this information into computer systems, thus enabling supply chains to monitor 
where their products are at all times. Major global companies, including distributors 
such as Wal-Mart and branded goods suppliers, such as Gillette, Procter & Gamble, 
Coca-Cola, Unilever, Johnson & Johnson are supporting the Auto-ID Labs, research 
entities working on the integration of tracking and communication technologies into 
B2B exchanges and on the architecture of the Internet of Things, which will 
significantly affect the way supply chains operate by, for instance, enabling higher in-
transit visibility and significantly cutting down logistics. Physical devices will get direct 
Internet connectivity including thermostats, refrigerators, and cars. 
One cannot help but notice the strategic position of digital platforms, which often 
act as gatekeepers for the Internet, as they enable direct interactions between groups 
of users. The significant amount of IP rights they hold over technology enable lead 
companies to control global digital value chains, extracting an important share of the 
total surplus value generated. These companies benefit from ‘network effects’, the 
value of their services increasing with the number of users and contribute significantly 
in digital value creation, notably through data accumulation. These multi-sided 
platforms rely on a great variety of business models fee-for-content revenue model, 
advertising-supported revenue models, fee for transaction or fee-for service revenue 
models, sometimes combining many of the above). 
Firms operating in each of the layers of a digital value chain face an important 
dilemma: they want to maximise their market power but they are also hurt if firms 
operating in other parts of the chain do so as well137. Their strategy is to increase 
competition in other parts of the chain by promoting entry and fragmenting supply, 
while maintaining their monopoly position in their segment of the chain and cooperate 
with monopolised segments, thus sharing between them the profits arising out of the 
activities of the chain, Competition authorities should realize that intervention at one 
segment of the vertical value chain may lead to adverse unintended consequences at 
other parts of the chain, thus making it necessary to  internalize the complexity of the 
digital value chain as an integral part of the overall business model and its 
organizational structure, and avoid any localized silo-based competition assessment 
of a particular segment. As we explained in the previous section, interfering with the 
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distribution of value across the various segments of the chain may be justified by the 
fact that firms enjoying network effects may discourage innovation, eventually affect 
consumers, as most value brought in is extracted by the lead firms, and affect the 
value of the entire value chain. Competition law enforcement may thus aim to limit the 
rents extracted so as to promote innovation across the value chain for the benefit of 
consumers or more broadly of the economy. 
The economic geography of these digital platforms indicates that many of them 
are present outside the US and the EU and in BRICS countries. This renders 
particularly important for BRICS competition authorities to study more thoroughly 
digital value chains and the interactions between software and hardware companies 
in this context, including issues relating to the allocation of the total surplus value of 
the digital chain. Similar studies should be performed in other economic areas affected 
by the fourth industrial revolution, such as the pharma-industry, biotechnology, artificial 
intelligence, robotics, agritech, etc. 
Advances in communication technologies may also change the dynamics of 
collusion. Information on prices, but also future pricing trends may be posted on web 
sites, making price signalling easier. Firm representatives may communicate through 
“facially anonymous” blogs and chat-rooms or web-casts, enabling instant and less 
traceable communication, than “old-fashioned” press conferences, conference 
meetings in “smoke-filled rooms,” etc.138 Price fixing through algorithms may replace 
more classic forms of collusion. This may render detection more difficult for 
competition authorities which are, at the same time, subject to more extensive due 
process requirements, as a result of the extension of human/fundamental rights 
protection for corporate defendants. 
Additionally, one needs to take into account the variety of industrialization 
strategies chosen and the important role of the State in the emergence of new 
technologies and innovation in general. Indeed, many important technological 
advances in various areas of the economy have relied on State funding of research 
and development and State investment in the further development and 
commercialisation of technologies.  
 
 
3. Balancing Economic Development and Fair Competition: 
Addressing Inequality and the Role of Competition Law 
 
The rise of inequality and relative, as well as absolute, poverty in Western societies 
the last three decades has been well documented. Yet, the post-World War II 
consensus among growth theorists was that income inequality is a driving force behind 
income growth, both within and between nations. This led to the perception that there 
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is an efficiency-equality trade-off. This consensus has been more recently subject to 
increased criticism. There is empirical evidence from several cross-country studies 
that shows how inequality has slowed down national growth rates and may be an 
impediment to growth139. More importantly, sharp inequalities of income or wealth may 
produce negative consequences by establishing some form of path dependence 
affecting growth, but also personal development, starting with the “unequal prenatal 
development of the foetus”, “unequal early childhood development” and investments 
by parents, including educational opportunities, but also “unequal returns to human 
capital because of discrimination at one end and use of parental connections in the 
job market at the other end”140. This “inter-generational transmission of inequality” may 
lead to “genetic unequalities”141.  
More importantly, the growing levels of inequality leads to political capture, thus 
creating a vicious cycle where elites influence policy making and regulations to the 
benefit of their interests, often resulting in policies that are detrimental to the interests 
of the many, which in turn makes inequality worse and reinforces the power of elites 
still further. This may be cause for major distrust in government and a surge in 
populism. 
There are many causes that explain this rise in poverty and inequality. One may 
consider that this is due to globalization of production, the erosion of collective 
bargaining systems, the continued drop in real wage values, tax evasion or unfair tax 
systems. But more importantly for our purposes, has been the recent focus on market 
power as a source of inefficiency and inequality. According to Joseph Stiglitz, “today’s 
markets are characterised by the persistence of high monopoly profits”142. Stiglitz does 
not accept Joseph Schumpeter’s view that monopolists would only be temporary and 
argues that today’s markets are characterized by the persistence of high monopoly 
profits. A recent report of the Council of Economic Advisers to the White House 
published in April 2016, tracks the rise of the concentration of various industries in the 
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US, noting that the “majority of industries have seen increases in the revenue share 
enjoyed by the 50 largest firms between 1997 and 2012”143.  
Important developments in the global economy have shifted the structure of various 
industries towards rising levels of concentration. One may cite the large waves of 
mergers, acquisitions and take-overs, following the liberalisation of markets and the 
retreat of State monopolies in various economic sectors, the growing importance of 
financial capital with the recent “rise of distorporation”, major industrial empires being 
controlled by master limited partnerships (MLP) managed by a few global equity 
companies and institutional investors144, the global expansion of intellectual property 
rights and the need for extensive levels of cooperation between global competitors 
through cross-licensing arrangements or patent pools, the development of the Internet 
and consequently the importance of network effects and platform competition. These 
have led to unprecedented levels of corporate consolidation at a global scale. 
Increasing levels of market concentration have become the rule, rather than the 
exception in various sectors of the American and European industry, in crucial, from a 
social welfare perspective, sectors such as agriculture, retailing, automobiles, banking 
and a number of manufacturing industries. 145  The upstream agriculture supply 
industries provide an interesting example of this concentration trend146. These high 
concentration levels may affect consumers and industries in BRICS and other 
emergent economies, thus building the case for a more active approach from BRICS 
towards these industries and a concern over global concentration and stealth 
consolidation through distorporation.  
It is important here to note that, in phase with the “new economics of inequality”, 
the approach here is not only to focus on inequality in the sense of more “equal” or 
“fair” distribution of the revenues generated by economic activity according to some 
principle of distributive justice, which is an aim that may be better pursued by other 
areas of law, such as tax law (although in each case this conclusion should be subject 
to comparative institutional analysis), but to ensure that there is “productivity-
enhancing asset redistribution”147, in the sense, for instance, that small and medium 
undertakings in the developing world have equal opportunities of access to global 
                                                          
143 White House CEA, Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power (April 2016), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf  
144 The Economist, Rise of the distorporation (Oct 26th, 2013). A recent study has also raised the related 
issue of horizontal shareholdings, a small group of institutions having acquired large shareholdings in 
horizontal competitors throughout various economic sectors, causing them to compete less vigorously 
with each other: See, ELHAUGE, Einer (2016), Horizontal Shareholding, 109 Harvard Law Review 
1267. 
145 For a number of examples drawing on the U.S. markets, see LINN, Barry C., Cornered - The New 
Monopoly Capitalism and the Economics of Destruction (Wiley, 2010). 
146  LIANOS, Ioannis, KATALEVSKY, Dmitry & IVANOV, Alexey (2016), The Global Seed Market, 
Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: Untying the Gordian Knot, CLES Research Paper 
Series, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2773422 
147 BOWLES, Samuel, The New Economics of Inequality and Re-distribution (Federico Caffè Lectures, 
CUP, 2012). 
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value chains, where, as we indicated above, most of the global economic activity takes 
place. This is clearly a competition law task, as it is beyond doubt that no other area 
of law disposes of the instruments to achieve this aim in an effective way. 
Traditionally, the analysis of market power, and the corresponding trade-offs 
outlined above, does not explicitly deal with distributional issues. The case against 
monopoly is motivated by the desire to correct for the inefficiency caused by lost 
(marginal) transactions — the deadweight loss — rather than the implicit wealth 
transfer from consumers to producers over (infra-marginal) transactions. Moreover, 
reliance on firms’ profitability as a guide for enforcement is problematic in light of the 
difficulty to tell whether high profits are the results of superior efficiency/quality, or the 
outcome of anticompetitive entry and expansion barriers. 
Nevertheless, tackling market power in order to improve consumer surplus is good 
for inequality, given that lower prices (or, better still, higher quality/price ratios) improve 
the purchasing power of disposable income. Moreover, where high profits are 
siphoned off by corporate elites (i.e., rather than returned to dispersed shareholders), 
the concern might be that the resulting concentration of income (and, over time, 
accumulated wealth) is deployed to lobby against redistributive fiscal policies aimed 
at addressing economic inequality. From a macro-economic perspective, the concern 
may be that high profits induced by anticompetitive entry and expansion barriers are 
not re-invested in high productivity industries but in low productivity ones as these 
assets are relatively easier to pledge as collaterals148. The resulting low levels of 
corporate investments would not only reduce aggregate demand, but also suppress 
productivity growth, which would ultimately constrain wage growth.149 Hence, under 
these circumstances, tough antitrust enforcement ought to be welcome from a 
distributional perspective as well.  
A recent paper of the OECD on Market Power and Wealth Distribution has 
attracted attention, as it shows a substantial impact of market power on wealth 
inequality150. According to the study which relies in terms of methodology on some 
work previously completed by Comanor and Smiley in 1975,151 market power may 
account for a substantial amount of wealth inequality. The report found that the 
increased margins charged to customers as a result of market power will 
disproportionately harm the poor who will pay more for goods without receiving a 
                                                          
148 CECCHETTI, Stephen and KHARROUBI Enisse (2015), Why does financial sector growth crowd 
out real economic growth?, CEPR Discussion Paper 10642, BIS WP 490 available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work490.htm . 
149 The Economist, Too much of a good thing - Profits are too high. America needs a giant dose of 
competition, May 26, 2016, available at http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-
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150  OECD, Market Power and Wealth Distribution, DAF/COMP(2015)10, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP(2015)10&docLa
nguage=En  
151 COMANOR, William S. & SMILEY, Robert H. (1975), Monopoly and the Distribution of Wealth, The 
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counter-balancing share of increased profits as they are not usually shareholders, 
while the wealthy benefit more from higher profits, due to their generally higher 
ownership of the stream of corporate profits and capital gains. This study only explored 
eight developed jurisdictions, thus showcasing the need for equivalent studies do be 
performed in the context of BRICS and emergent/developing countries. 
But is there a case for equality beyond a possible negative effect of inequality on 
growth and efficiency? Can competition law integrate “equality” concerns, without 
necessarily these being related to economic efficiency? And if this is done, how could 
this be integrated in competition law assessment and what would be its limiting 
principles, as competition law may not have the means, or it may not be desirable, to 
go after any form of inequality, in particular if this results from “business acumen” and 
“competition on the merits”. Michael Walzer’s concept of “complex equality” may 
provide a useful limiting principle 152 : it is important to intervene in situations of 
pervasive inequality, which does not only affect wealth, income and social status, but 
more generally the equality of “moral status” and mutual respect, as well as the equal 
participation in global politics, as citizens of the world having an equal say for decisions 
affecting the future of mankind153.  
In his recent book on Inequality: What can be done? Tony Atkinson suggests that 
“(p)ublic policy should aim at a proper balance of power among stakeholders, and to 
this end should a) introduce an explicitly distributional dimension into competition 
policy; […]”154. This proposal raises a number of questions with regard to the way 
competition law may square with inequality concerns. 
First, is the distributional dimension already taken into account in competition law? 
And if yes, is a “proper” balance of power among stakeholders achieved? Who should 
define this “proper” balance of power? 
Second, are the concepts and instruments of competition law ready for a more 
pronounced distributional dimension? What would be the concepts and instruments 
one needs to develop and the reforms one needs to bring to modern competition law 
enforcement so as to make it more distributive justice compatible? 
Third, how a more proactive distributive justice agenda in competition law may 
square with the global governance of antitrust and the fact that consumers are mostly 
found in developed countries (rather than developing ones) and that many of the 
actions taken by competition authorities may be thought of as focusing only on certain 
parts of the population with higher than average income? 
Fourth, is the lack of competition one of the causes of the inequality currently 
observed in developed countries, such as the Unites States and the European Union? 
                                                          
152 WALZER, Michael, Spheres of Justice: In Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books, 1984). 
153 HAUSMAN, Daniel M. (2016), Equality versus Priority: A Badly Misleading Distinction, available at 
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Fifth, it seems that the growing financialisation of the economy has played some 
role in exacerbating inequalities. As a CEPR blog report recently noted “(t)he financial 
sector has seen a moderate increase in its share of the workforce and a dramatic 
increase in pay per worker (between 1978 and 2000, wages rose 73.7 percent in the 
financial sector but rose just 12.0 percent in the private sector more generally). These 
two factors have allowed finance to capture a growing share of wages and made it so 
most Americans are unable to share in the economy’s gains”155. If this is true, has the 
lack of an active competition law enforcement with regard to the financial sector for 
decades played a role? Are the existing competition law tools sufficient, or not, to take 
into account the growing importance of overlapping financial investor ownership? 
What can be done to remedy this problem, in case of course this is something one 
considers to be a priority? 
The BRICS countries may play a significant role in pushing for the integration of 
the inequality dimension in the agenda of competition authorities and in engaging in a 
reflection on competition law’s eventual contribution in this highly contentious area, 
which has been ignored by the mainstream NPT approach.156 
 
4. Enhancing the participation of forgotten stakeholders in 
the global discussion 
 
The NPT-based model for competition law has developed alongside the focus put 
on consumer welfare, which became the totemic goal allegedly pursued by most 
competition law regimes around the world157.  
Consumer welfare may take different dimensions and meanings, but it remains 
an essential concept in competition law analysis, allegedly enabling a rigorous 
assessment of the competitive effects of a specific conduct on an important class of 
protected interests by legislation. Yet, despite its central position in competition law 
assessment, the concept of consumer welfare may not provide an adequate protection 
to the interests of other important stakeholders that may also be affected by alleged 
restrictions of competition. For instance, countries exporting agricultural commodities 
may not find in their interest to implement consumer welfare focused competition law 
statutes, but would find it preferable, from the viewpoint of their interests, to offer a 
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economy is judged to be desirable, it may be achieved through lump-sum transfers, hence separating 
efficiency from distributive justice. Following the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of efficiency, economic policy 
recommendations should be determined by efficiency, distribution remaining a problem for the political 
realm (the separability thesis). 
157 For a critical discussion of this concept, see LIANOS, Ioannis (2013),  Some Reflections on the 
Questions of the Goals of EU Competition Law, in Ioannis Lianos & Damien Geradin  (eds.), Handbook 
on European Competition Law: Substantive Aspects 9Edward Elgar, 2013), pp. 1-84; See also, 
ORBACH, Barak (2011), The Antitrust Consumer Welfare paradox, Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics, 7, 133-164  who “chronicles how academic confusion and thoughtless judicial borrowing 
led to the rise of a label that 30 years later has no clear meaning”: 
58 
 
sufficient high level of protection of their producers against abuses of dominant 
positions by global buyers and processor companies.  
Moving beyond consumers should not nevertheless lead to the inclusion of any 
sort of consideration in competition assessment. But it may however open the door to 
a different form of economics that would look at all the costs to the economy, and not 
only those relating to higher prices or the effect on innovation. All material and 
symbolic costs relating to the specific economic activity should be analysed, 
depending of course on the availability of adequate tools to take them into account (for 
instance, unemployment, consumption of medicines, sustainable development, etc.). 
Bringing in additional stakeholders may provide a missing dimension of great political 
importance to the discussion. For example, it is clear that farmers’ interests are 
affected by the high pace of concentration of the factors of production, processing and 
retail markets. Faced with a reality of decreasing revenues, small farmers are pressed 
to produce even more agricultural commodities in order to earn short-term income in 
an attempt to meet daily expenses, which leads to oversupply and the vicious circle of 
further depression of prices, sometimes even below the average cost of production. 
This has particularly devastating consequences in the developing world and emerging 
economies, as most of their active population is employed in farming, these effects not 
being alleviated through a high level of state subsidies, as it is the case in Europe, for 
instance. In view of the inability of major developed countries’ competition authorities 
to control excessive buyer power, because of the remoteness of the effects of such 
power on their consumers, according to the effects doctrine, developing jurisdictions, 
in which the majority of impoverished farmers are located, should be able to tackle the 
anticompetitive effect of these practices, in collaboration with the jurisdictions in which 
the dominant agribusiness buyers are domiciled.158 
This may also alter the decision procedure and decision criteria employed in 
order to assess anticompetitive practices. For instance, some competition authorities 
take into account sustainability benefits when assessing an otherwise anticompetitive 
agreement.159 Some authorities have even gone as far (actually quite far!) in this 
direction as including in the cost benefit analysis “animal welfare”, leading the authority 
to accept that an agreement that may raise consumer prices but at the same time 
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enhances animal welfare can be justified if the gains in sustainability offset the price-
increase resulting from the agreement.160  
Some claim that such a trade-off is impossible in view of the incommensurability 
problem, the benefits and costs being of different kind, or in other words, qualitatively 
different. Commensuration is indeed “the expression or measurement of 
characteristics normally represented by different units according to a common 
metric,”161  that being utility, price, efficiency, competition. However, the trade-offs 
involved between static and dynamic efficiency (actual and future consumers), or 
those between price and quality, or even between the different individual consumers 
of the group of consumers affected by the specific restrictive conduct in the “relevant 
market,” may equally be described as conducive to the incommensurability problem.162 
Balancing various social values is also an exercise routinely undertaken by 
constitutional and administrative courts, sometimes involving issues of greater 
complexity than the more confined type of economic balancing needed in the context 
of a competition law dispute.163 The alleged incommensurability problem also ignores 
that commensuration is a social process, by essence deeply political.164 Comparison 
is excluded between the values thought as incommensurables. However, the choice 
of finding that values are incommensurable might also indicate that each of these 
values relies on justifications characterized by different logics, or different “orders of 
worth”. 165  In this case, other decision procedures than balancing may be more 
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165  BOLTANSKI, Luc & THÉVENOT, Laurent, On Justification: Economies of Worth (Princeton 
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appropriate, such as lexicographic (or lexical) ordering (so that certain values may 
take priority with respect to other values without however this leading to the 
suppression of the second ordered value), trumping (some values trumping others), 
combinations of trumping with balancing, etc. The administrability of these various 
decision procedures and their proper design so as to limit substantive errors and 
procedural costs provides fertile ground for research that may be undertaken by the 
BRICS competition authorities in the context of the BRICS Joint Research Platform, 
on the basis, for instance of empirical research relating to the integration of public 
interest objectives and requirements in the competition assessment of mergers166. 
 
5. Reconnecting Antitrust with “Real” Markets, Competition, 
Politics and Culture 
 
The BRICS Joint Research Platform will aim to expand the knowledge base of 
competition law by integrating the insights of different disciplines shedding light on the 
way markets really function and their interaction with politics and culture in general. 
This would require for instance more work done on behavioural economics, economic 
sociology and political economy.  
Taking forward the example of behavioural economics, in a seminal contribution 
published in 1955, Herbert Simon noted that an individual may not choose his most 
preferred alternative, but one that is sufficiently satisficing according to his 
preferences.167 Simon advanced the bounded rationality theory as a challenge to both 
the descriptive accounts of how individuals (and firms) behave, but also to the 
normative account of how individuals (and firms) ought to behave. His objective was 
to “replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational behaviour that 
is compatible with the access to information and the computational capacities that are 
actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which 
such organisms exist.”168 Simon indicated that the work done by psychologists on 
choice and learning could be a valuable source of wisdom for economics, although he 
did not have high hopes about this either. In the absence of usable psychological work, 
he advanced the view that common experience may be a valuable source in order to 
understand the “gross characteristics of human choice”. Simon suggested some 
modifications to the rationality principle so that it corresponds better to observed 
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166 See, for instance, on public interest objectives and merger control, RASLAN, Azza, Public Policy 
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behaviour processes in humans. This would, for instance, take into account, the cost 
of gathering information for an individual to make a choice, the process being iterative, 
or the fact that individuals often make a partial ordering of pay-offs, instead of making 
a complete ordering by constructing a scale of pay-offs. The more context dependent 
view of rationality put forward by Simon broke with the conceptualisation of individuals 
by rational choice theory as well-programmed automatons. It also offered an 
explanation for the discrepancies observed between the Rational Choice theory model 
and reality.  
Following the footprints of Simon, a new shift took place in the late 1970s with 
the work of psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who attracted greater 
attention to psychology in contemporary economic theory.169 The psychological trend 
that transpires in many recent economic movements, such as behavioral law and 
economics, experimental economics and neuro-economics, transforms economics to 
a sort of cognitive science, where economic behaviour is reconceived on the basis of 
“psychological facts” discovered with the method of experimental introspection. The 
psychological experiments showed that individuals discount hyperbolically, as some 
consequences of choice (rewards) are delayed and individuals prefer rewards that 
arrive sooner rather than later, thus discounting the value of later rewards. They also 
demonstrated that the same individual may have inconsistent inter-temporal choices, 
as an individual may express a preference for option A instead of B, but after a lapse 
of time prefer B instead of A.  
More importantly, Kahneman’s and Tversky’s research showed that human 
behaviour may be described as the outcome of two different cognitive 
systems/processes of choice, which inhabit every individual.170 In what was called 
System 1, the individual operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and 
no sense of voluntary control. Decisions are reached through intuition, emotional and 
affective elements playing an important role in decision-making, which relies on 
heuristics. In System 2, the individual allocates attention to effortful mental activities, 
including complex computations. System 2 is mobilised when a question arises for 
which System 1 does not offer an answer, or when an event is detected that violates 
the model of the world that System 1 maintains. The division of labour between System 
1 and System 2 is highly efficient as it minimizes effort and optimizes performance. 
Processing power biases of individuals may push them to a choice overload, where 
the multiplication of the options offered to consumers may lead to sub-optimal choice, 
in the sense that consumers may follow rules of thumbs, for instance imitating what 
other consumers do rather than make their own decisions, in order to satisfy their 
preferences. 
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Tversky and Kahneman also advanced a theory explaining decision-making 
under conditions of risk. They argued that most people violate all the axioms of 
expected utility theory. Their prospect theory is based on psychophysical models and 
presents a different account, and a more accurate prediction, of how people really 
behave. 171  Kahneman and Tversky were however careful not to challenge the 
normative foundations of Rational Choice Theory and its axiomatic view of individual 
behaviour.  
In summary, Kahneman and Tversky found that people's attitudes toward risks 
concerning gains may be quite different from their attitudes toward risks concerning 
losses. Loss aversion and endowment effect imply that selling prices should be higher 
than buying prices, since the minimal compensation people demand to give up a good 
is often several times larger than the maximum amount they are willing to pay for a 
commensurate entitlement.172 They also distinguished between different phases of 
decision-making. During the editing/framing phase of decision making, they observed 
the influence of framing effects, as choosing an option may be affected by the order 
or manner in which it is presented to a decision maker and choice can be affected by 
trivial manipulations in the construction of available options. During the evaluation 
phase in decision-making, the status quo serves as an operative reference point and 
hence has a value function, while a different function, the weighing function, measures 
the impact of the probability of an event on the desirability of a prospect. They 
advanced the idea that this psycho-scientific framework should be adopted as a basis 
for investigating individual (economic) behaviour. 
Initially, work accomplished by behavioural scientists with anthropologists 
attempted to explore how preferences were formed through the interaction of an 
individual with the environment in which its action was set. Research on the 
foundations of human sociality found that preferences were not exogenous but that 
they are shaped by the economic and social interactions of everyday life, thus 
questioning the foundations of marginal and ordinal utility theory, which take 
preferences as a given and a fixed norm that influences decision-making173. Adopting 
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an approach that would have analysed preferences as an exogenous factor could 
have tarnished the pretention of economics to make accurate predictions as to the 
effects of economic behaviour. The mainstream behavioural economics programme 
thus took care of not challenging the fundamental assumption of a fixed universal 
benchmark of full rationality as a normative criterion for making decisions, although it 
improved the empirical realism of economic models by describing instances in which 
individuals’ behaviour violates the principles of full rationality. In essence, behavioural 
economics attempted to draw a map of bounded rationality, by exploring the 
systematic biases that people show in their day-to-day behaviour in relation to choices 
a fully rational agent would have made in similar circumstances. For instance, people 
may make choices that could satisfy their immediate (hot) preferences (e.g. smoking 
a cigarette), which they would have changed had they behaved as if they were fully 
rational agents (e.g. the “cold” preference of staying healthy for a longer period of 
time). A possible avenue for research will be to abandon the rational choice 
perspective as a normative criterion and explore the role of culture and social norms 
in influencing preferences, thus accounting more accurately for the “real” behaviour of 
consumers in various settings. 
Limits in the cognitive capacities of consumers lead them to boundedly rational 
choices, or as economist Dan Ariely puts it, they act as “predictably irrational”.174 
People tend to make judgments about the likelihood of an event, on the basis of how 
easily this event comes to mind (the availability heuristic), hence, indicating that prior 
exposure to a number of events may influence an individual’s subsequent 
judgments.175 Similarity of an event/product may also serve as a cognitive shortcut in 
decision-making, which explains, for instance, why the package of a generic (store) 
brand (private label) looks similar to that of an established national brand in order to 
influence consumers’ choice (the representativeness heuristic) 176 . Ariely and his 
colleagues advance the concept of “zero-price effect,” which suggests that the usual 
cost-benefit analysis cannot account for the psychological effect of a free good, 
consumers perceiving it as intrinsically more valuable than a reduction of the price of 
the same product from £0,15 to £ 0,01, because of the “affect heuristic” associating 
free goods with a good feeling, which surfaces automatically when someone makes 
decisions under System 1.177 
Decisions in risky or uncertain situations are often influenced by anticipatory 
feelings and emotions experienced in the moment of decision-making.178 Humans are 
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also averse to change and exhibit a status quo bias, the formation of a habit making it 
difficult to dis-engage, unless the incentive to do so is strong. However, this may 
indicate that higher prices may not be enough for consumers to switch their existing 
suppliers, procrastination and inertia eventually limiting their ability to exercise an 
active choice.179 Of particular interest is also the fact that humans often attach more 
importance to present events than future events, discounting future benefits for actual 
benefits. Thus discounting is non-linear and its rate may vary over time. Time 
inconsistency bias may also manifest itself by the impossibility to predict accurately 
our preferences in the future.180 Preferences are also context-dependent, the framing 
of the choice exercising an important influence over the decision of consumers.181 
Consumers do not make decisions in isolation, in order to satisfy their given 
preferences. They are also embedded in social environments, which inevitably 
influence, one might even say construct their preferences. 182  Because of these 
broader social preferences that often frame individual ones, people show that they 
prefer fairness and reciprocity over inequality and pursuing one’s own self-interest.183 
It is not only monetary incentives that count, but also people’s perception of self, in 
other words, their social identity.184 Preferences are influenced by social roles, and 
more broadly social norms, which vary across cultures and contexts. Preferences may 
even follow choice, instead of guiding it, the order of preferences aiming mainly to 
rationalize/justify actions after the fact.  
The behavioural economics approach challenges the theory of revealed 
preferences, as it cannot be assumed that consumers’ choice on the marketplace 
represents their “true preferences,” the latter being defined as the preferences that a 
fully rational individual would have developed, had he all the relevant factual 
information and the unlimited cognitive abilities to evaluate it through a careful cost 
benefit analysis. The welfare analysis in competition law works within a revealed 
preferences paradigm, when relevant and reliable data on actual purchases are 
available. The use of quantitative methods (econometrics) enables in this case 
competition authorities to estimate the elasticities of demand, in particular the cross-
price elasticity of demand, which measures the sensitivity of demand for one category 
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of products to the price of another category. However, such data is not often available 
or not specific enough to estimate the cross-price elasticities of demand for the 
product(s) in question, in which case properly designed survey methods will measure 
preferences over hypothetical products and alternatives. In this case, the preferences 
will be stated, as opposed to revealed preferences. Discrete choice survey methods 
attempt to mimic the situation of choice faced by the consumer in the real-world, but it 
is a proxy really for revealed preferences, assuming that the survey is well designed, 
the process was conducted so as to assure objectivity, and that a representative 
sample of consumers to be surveyed has been selected. However, behavioural 
economics may question the link between preferences (revealed or stated) and 
welfare, which forms the basis for the welfare analysis performed in competition law. 
One may not go as far as to challenge the assumptions of methodological 
individualism altogether, assuming that this is the dominant approach in economics185 
but it certainly becomes important to acknowledge the crucial role of social structures 
in framing preferences. This calls for a more extensive analysis of culture and social 
norms of the BRICS societies. 
This also raises interesting questions as to the existence of “authentic,” extant 
preferences, which competition law should be deemed to protect, but which can also 
be considered as previously-constructed preferences that may have “stabilized over 
time, with repeated exposure to sufficiently similar stimuli, so that now they are 
retrieved from memory rather than constructed ad-hoc when consumers face a similar 
(even if not identical) choice”. 186  The choice construction may partly depend on 
consumer’s more abstract values, but also partly on the context of the specific choice 
and the options to be evaluated.187 The rise of behavioural economics does not only 
impact on the demand side through the analysis of consumer biases but may also 
influence how the supply side of the market is analysed, firms often acting to 
exacerbate and exploit consumer biases, at every stage in the decision-making 
process.188  
The role of political institutions in the emergence of markets needs also to be 
highlighted, market building constituting an important task ensured by the State, in 
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particular in emerging economies.189 The State plays an important role in stabilizing 
markets, often called by incumbent companies eager to enjoy stability and limit 
disruptive competition. One needs to move beyond simplistic opposition between 
State capitalism and private enterprise capitalism that ignore the permeable role of the 
State in the making and development of markets, and its contribution to the innovative 
effort of private corporations,190  and engage with the various development paths 
chosen by the various States and the role of competition law in each specific context. 
Competition law should take into account this complex environment, even more so as 
the division of functions between politics and the economy is not as clear cut in 
emergent and developing countries as it is in the US and the EU. Social institutions, 
including the State, play an important role in shaping the economic sphere.  
The role of culture and of the different varieties of capitalism in competition law 
is also a rapidly expanding area of research.191 But more generally, we should be able 
to critically engage with new work in economics challenging the NPT framework and 
suggesting different theoretical frameworks in order to understand the way “real 
competition” works in the global marketplace192, and the impact of path-dependent 
lack of “real competition” on the development and growth trajectories of emerging and 
developing countries193. 
 
6. Re-negotiating the boundaries of the “regulatory” sciences of 
competition law 
 
The integration of scientific knowledge, in particular economics, in the decision-
making process in the area of competition law, since the 1970s, has been a major step 
in the transformation of modern competition law to some form of technocratic 
enterprise.194 This is not of course a unique development as many other areas of 
social regulation, starting with environmental regulation, have seen a similar pattern. 
In her seminal work on science advisors, Sheilla Jasanoff has noted how the 
expansion of the role of technical experts led to an isolation of the scientific and 
political decision-making and the positivistic value-fact separation.195 It has also led to 
the emergence of a “regulatory science (science used in policy making),” or “mandated 
science,” which presents distinct characteristics from “science in a research setting” 
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(or ordinary science).196 Regulatory science includes “a component of knowledge 
production,” as does ordinary science, but also a “substantial component of knowledge 
synthesis,” which includes “secondary activities, such as evaluation, screening, and 
meta-analysis”.197 “Regulatory science” is largely “predictive,” as it feeds decision-
making, the latter being constrained by time and resources, in contrast to an ordinary 
science-setting where a long process of peer reviewing assures a gate-keeping 
function.198 Regulatory science also obeys different standards of validity than ordinary 
science, as these are the products of “uneasy bargains”199 between the scientific 
experts, in our case economists, and the other actors in the competition law process 
(judges, lawyers, interest groups).200 
Because of the volume of cases more mature competition law systems, such 
as the US and the EU, exercise an important influence on the type of economic 
expertise usually presented in competition cases and the methods of assessing such 
expertise. More recent competition law systems attempt to emulate these processes 
and often transplant institutional and evidence law innovations developed in the US 
and the EU, such as the position of chief economist, specialised courts in the area of 
competition law, the hot tub procedure for examining party experts, etc. However, 
despite these common trends, the way economics is integrated in each system of 
competition law depends on the specific evidence eco-system and more generally 
legal culture.  
While not focusing on the competition economics field, Marion Fourcade’s 
excellent comparative cultural sociology analysis of the dialectic relationship between 
culture and economics in the United States, France and the UK provides a useful 
account of the linkages between institutions and economic analysis, and in particular 
the impact of national constellations and various institutional logics on the 
development of economic theory and methodology.201 One needs to take into account 
the institutional specificities, but also more generally the availability of sufficient 
economic expertise in these jurisdictions in order to re-work the boundaries between 
regulatory science (for instance, economics) and the legal system. For instance, more 
work needs to be done on the way competition authorities and the judiciary in 
emergent and developing economies deal with economic (and other technical) experts 
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and the impact of the use of economic evidence on the margin of discretion of 
competition authorities and the standards of judicial review.202 
It is also possible that the local market for economic expertise has been 
foreclosed by the litigation tactics of (global) corporations which proceed by hiring the 
best experts in order to limit their availability for the competition authorities or private 
litigants. One may also note more complex entanglements between economic 
expertise and the corporate world, some global corporations integrating in their 
litigation strategy the systematic commissioning of articles to academics, thus further 
reducing the available options for getting unbiased scientific advice. Such foreclosure 
may prove to be a profitable strategy in emergent and developing jurisdictions where 
specialised economic expertise in the area of competition law is not often in sufficient 
supply. 
The establishment of the BRICS Joint Research Platform will provide BRICS 
competition authorities but also other emergent and developing jurisdictions a pool of 
unbiased academic experts from around the world from which they would be able to 
draw on resources for their industry studies, investigations, but also horizontal topics 
of interest. The Platform will also engage with empirical work on the use of economics 
and other sources of evidence by competition authorities and courts in the BRICS 
jurisdictions and will aim to suggest institutional reforms and innovations that will 
enhance the quality of decision-making in these jurisdictions. The Platform should also 
facilitate the use of big data analytics, socio-metric techniques and advanced social 
network analysis, which will enable BRICS competition authorities to widen their 
perspective and respond to a broader array of tasks. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
More than a decade after the failure of the most recent efforts to establish a global 
governance of competition law in the context of the WTO, and following the elaboration 
of the current flexible network-form of governance at the centre of which sits the 
International Competition Network, there is a clear understanding that the current 
institutional setting cannot tackle the externalities generated by more than 120 
competition law regimes that may potentially regulate parts of the global economy. 
This raises important concerns to global businesses that need to comply with multiple, 
and often incompatible, standards. The call for policy convergence aims to mitigate 
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these concerns, while enabling established competition law regimes, such as that of 
the US and Europe, to influence the convergence point and more generally to take 
ownership of the process.  
This state of affairs can first be criticized for not taking into account the different 
patterns of diffusion of competition law and consequently the variety of competition 
law systems emerging out of the original US antitrust law model and its EU competition 
law “spin-off”. Expecting convergence towards the US model, as it is now 
implemented, or towards an idealized economics NPT-based model, seems naïve at 
best and normatively contestable. Indeed, the call for convergence mainly emanates 
from global business which, understandably, is not keen to incur the costs of 
overlapping jurisdictions by different competition law systems.  
One needs, however, to take a broader perspective and engage with other 
affected interests, which are often not represented in the debate on the global 
governance of competition law. I put forward a “participation-centred” approach that 
would seek to avoid both majority and minority biases, the ultimate objective being not 
policy convergence as such, but increasing levels of total trust between competition 
authorities and between competition authorities and their stakeholders. The lack of 
participation in this global deliberative space of emergent and developing economies, 
the inability of various affected interests to be considered and the disproportional 
weight in the decision-making process of the two most mature competition law 
regimes, the US and the EU, favour a greater involvement of the BRICS and other 
emergent competition law jurisdictions in the discussion over the architecture of the 
global governance of competition law.  
I suggest the establishment of a BRICS Joint Research Platform which, in 
addition to its task to improve the quality of decision-making within BRICS, will also 
serve as an alternative forum in the global deliberative space in the area of competition 
law. Its distinctive role will be to represent the views of the BRICS jurisdictions, but 
also to serve as a knowledge platform, contributing innovative ideas, elaborated with 
the requisite academic robustness, to the global deliberative space in competition law. 
The paper provides some initial thoughts on the themes/directions that the BRICS 
Joint Research Platform may choose to follow. 
